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This Article argues that mass torte involving multiple tortfeasors can be wel-
fare enhancing. It begins by investigating the role of "dilution of liability"-a phe-
nomenon that has been condemned for its role in facilitating accidents. According
to the literature, in alternative care situations where the damage to the victim is
constant, dilution of liability leads to inefficient precaution levels and consequently
to more (bad) accidents. The Article deviates from this literature and shows that
dilution of liability can be welfare enhancing. This is so even in the quintessential
case where dilution of liability has been denounced. The Article further shows that
an activity that is socially undesirable and should give rise to liability can become
desirable as the number of tortfeasors increases. Put differently, it shows that in
some situations an activity that would and should be condemned if conducted by
one tortfeasor may become socially desirable if done by many. The Article analyzes
the conditions under which such desirable tortfests" occur, and it has important
implications to the salience literature. After investigating the impact of tortfests on
actors'precaution and activity levels, the Article examines mechanisms that would
incentivize actors, in certain situations, to join a group wrongdoing or combine
with others to initiate one. The result, it is argued, could increase societal welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that mass torts involving multiple tort-
feasors can be welfare enhancing. It begins by investigating the
role of "dilution of liability"-a phenomenon that has been con-
demned for its role in facilitating wrongdoing. Dilution of liabil-
ity often occurs when multiple tortfeasors engage in a wrongful
activity that results in an indivisible harm. Because liability is
spread among the tortfeasors, the incentive to take care is re-
duced as the number of tortfeasors increases. If liability is im-
posed on a large enough number of tortfeasors, the expected lia-
bility of each tortfeasor may decrease to the point where no one
would take care. The result, it is argued, is a net social loss.
The following example is illustrative. Assume that four by-
standers, A, B, C, and D, can each avoid an expected harm of
$100 to the victim at a total cost of $60. Taking precaution is so-
cially desirable (60 < 100). But even if all had a duty to furnish
aid to the victim, none would. Because the total damage is
spread among the bystanders such that each expects to be liable
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for only a fraction of the damage, here one-fourth (or $25),' tak-
ing precaution is just bad business. It simply does not make any
sense to invest $60 in precaution to avoid an expected liability of
$25. Each bystander would prefer to do nothing and face an ex-
pected judgment of $25 rather than invest ex ante $60 in pre-
caution. Of course, if there were more bystanders on whom the
law imposed a duty, the incentive to take precaution would de-
cline even further. In the case of fifty bystanders, for example,
none would invest in precaution more than $2 (100/50). Or con-
sider a situation where a gas supplier and a restaurant owner
could have each avoided a $100 damage to a patron if the former
invested $60 in a detection device or the latter purchased a $70
fire extinguisher. Here, both tortfeasors are liable.2 Each had a
duty that was breached, resulting in a harm to the victim. Yet,
neither will take precaution because the cost of precaution out-
weighs the expected judgment (60, 70 > 100/2).
Focusing on similar examples, the prior literature concluded
that tort law imposes liability on one or a few salient tortfeasors
in order to avoid the dilution of liability.3 The salient tortfeasor
may be the one who can avoid the accident at the lowest cost (for
example, the gas supplier in the restaurant example). Or, it may
be someone who is likely to be the best risk avoider (perhaps a
bystander who has a "special relationship" with the victim). But
the choice can be strictly arbitrary. In the examples above, im-
posing liability on the blue-eyed bystander or the tallest one
could be as efficient.4 Being solely responsible for the entire
1 With some simplifying assumptions, this result is independent of the apportion-
ment regime. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Apportioning Liability behind a Veil of Uncertain-
ty, 62 Hastings L J 1729, 1756-69 (2011).
2 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors:
An Economic Analysis, 9 J Legal Stud 517, 526-28 (1980). Note that efficiency requires
that only one of the two, the lowest cost avoider (here the gas supplier), take care. This
result can be achieved by holding both initially liable, but then using the doctrine of in-
demnity to shift the entire burden to the gas supplier. Id at 526-27. See also text accom-
panying notes 20-24. A different approach would be to exempt the restaurant owner, the
higher-cost avoider, from liability altogether.
3 See, for example, Landes and Posner, 9 J Legal Stud at 526 (cited in note 2); Saul
Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the
Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va L Rev 879, 937-38 (1986); Alon Harel and Assaf
Jacob, An Economic Rationale for the Legal Treatment of Omissions in Tort Law: The
Principle of Salience, 3 Theoretical Inq L 413, 414, 422 (2002); Assaf Jacob, Dilution of
Liability and Multiple Tortfeasors in the Context of Liability for Unrequested Precau-
tions, 108 Mich L Rev First Impressions 12, 13 (2009). See also Part I.
4 See Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 429 (cited in note 3). The solution is
imperfect. The "tallest person" criterion may lead to inefficiency if it is not clear who is
the tallest and therefore who should take care. The "blue eye" criterion is easier in this
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damage, the chosen bystander will invest $60 in precaution to
avoid paying $100 in damages. The result may be hard to justify
on moral grounds since all actors are assumed to be at fault. It
may also contradict notions of corrective justice as the salience
solution exempts all but one tortfeasor from liability based on an
arbitrary criterion. But, the argument goes, it can be justified on
economic grounds.5
The focus of the prior literature was on alternative care sit-
uations where any party could avoid the harm (for example, any
of the bystanders could save the victim). In these situations, di-
lution of liability was condemned as resulting in inefficient pre-
caution levels. This Article shows that dilution of liability is not
just a "problem"* that must be remedied. Rather, it argues that
dilution of liability can be socially desirable. Notably missing
from the literature is an analysis of the impact of dilution of lia-
bility on beneficial activities. The bystanders and restaurant ex-
amples are situations where, if the accident occurs, society
would undoubtedly be worse off. These are "bad" accidents in
that they do not entail any benefits. They only impose a cost.
Moreover, in these examples none of the actors was interested in
causing the accident. The bystanders, the gas supplier, and the
restaurant owner would have all preferred to avoid the accident
and the resulting payment to the victim. They would have
avoided the accident if their liability was not diluted or if they
could have entered an agreement to share the cost of precaution.7
But not all accidents are the same. Some are socially desir-
able. Certain activities are so indispensable that, although they
come at some cost to others, they are considered necessary evils
that a modern society must accept. Power plant facilities, farm-
ing operations, sewer systems, landfills, gas stations, cellular
respect (each bystander likely knows the color of her eyes), but it may lead to over-
investment in precaution (if more than one person has blue eyes) or under-investment (if
no one does). Even if the arbitrary criterion serves as an effective anti-dilution mecha-
nism by singling out only one tortfeasor, it may not be optimal if the chosen one is not
the best risk avoider.
5 Id. See also text accompanying note 31. This is especially the case when the best
risk avoider cannot be identified or where each of the agents is the best risk avoider as is
the case in the bystanders example.
6 Jacob, 108 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 14 (cited in note 3).
7 In the bystanders example, if transaction costs were not prohibitive (and assum-
ing all were liable in the eyes of the law), the four would agree to share the $60 cost of
precaution, rather than collectively be subject to an expected judgment of $100.
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phone towers, and cement factories are but a few examples.$
Other activities confer benefits as well as costs that can be
avoided, but as the number of actors increases, taking care may
not be justified.
Consider, for example, a situation where each camper in a
heavily forested area values camping at $50, and that each must
invest $40 in precaution to avoid a fire that would destroy the
victim's $90 cabin.9 Assume further that if a number of campers
fail to take care, the several fires would merge and destroy the
cabin together. If one camper is on the premises, she would take
care and she should (40 < 90). With two campers, the expected
liability each faces is much smaller, $45 (90/2), but the incentive
to take care is still strong. Each would invest $40 to avoid an
expected judgment of $45 and would realize a net expected gain
of $10 (50 - 40). But if three campers are on the premises (and
each believes or knows that the others or even just a large
enough number of campers are present), none would take care,
nor should they! Note that camping is still socially desirable be-
cause the total benefits from the activity outweigh the cost
(50 x 3 > 90). Taking care, however, is not. It simply does not
make sense to require each camper to invest $40 up to a total of
$120 (40 x 3) to avoid damaging a $90 cabin.
Dilution of liability here is the cure to what would otherwise
be an over-investment in precaution. In the first step, liability is
imposed on an individual cost-benefit analysis. Here, each
camper who did not take care will be found liable because the
cost of precaution is less than the expected harm to the victim.
Then, as a second step, liability is diluted exactly at the point
where the total cost of precaution would outweigh the benefit.
Dilution of liability thus serves here as a sorting mechanism to
distinguish between accidents that are socially net beneficial
and those that are not. It incentivizes actors to avoid inefficient
8 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291, comment e (1965); id at § 292, comment
a ("The operation of railways and other public utilities, no matter how carefully carried
on, produces accidents which kill or harm many people but the risk involved in the oper-
ation is more than counterbalanced by the service which they render the public."); id at
§ 822, comment g; id at § 826, comments a, b, f ("In the case of a cement factory polluting
the air with dust, the utility may be reflected in society's need for building materials.");
Losee v Buchanan, 51 NY 476, 484 (1873) (after noting that members of society are com-
pelled to give up many of their rights, the court explains that "[w]e must have factories,
machinery, dams, canals and railroads").
9 The example is based on Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm § 27, comment a, illustration 1 (2010), and Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 433A, comment i, illustrations 14-15.
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accidents (in the case of one or two campers) but engage in
cost-justified activities. This sorting mechanism comes at a low
cost. The courts do not need to engage in the complicated task of
measuring the total benefits from the actors' activity and the
aggregate cost of precautions if care is taken. Nor do the courts
need to identify the point where precaution should not be taken.
Instead, the courts simply need to apply traditional tort theory
to determine the liability of each tortfeasor based on an individ-
ual analysis-a task they perform regularly. The decisions to
operate and to take care (and the risks that accompany these
decisions) are then shifted to the actors themselves.
. By focusing on such valuable activities, this Article shows
that dilution of liability can serve a different role. Not only can it
reduce the incentives of existing actors to take care, but in some
situations it may even incentivize actors to join others in com-
mitting a wrongdoing-the Article uses the term "tortfest" to re-
fer to such situations. What the prior literature missed is that
dilution of liability may result in a tortfest, and that the tortfest
can be socially desirable. Moreover, the Article shows that an ac-
tivity that may be socially harmful if conducted by few can be-
come desirable as the number of tortfeasors increases. Thus, the
Article shows that in some situations an activity that should be
condemned if conducted by one or a few tortfeasors may become
socially and economically justifiable if conducted by many.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins
with a review of the prior literature. It shows that dilution of li-
ability has been described as a concern mainly in situations (1)
of alternative care where the entire harm can be avoided by any
of the tortfeasors and (2) where the damage does not increase
with the number of tortfeasors. It reveals that the analysis often
ignored the gains to the tortfeasors and was doctrine specific, fo-
cusing on elements such as duty, apportionment rules, and de-
fenses such as contributory negligence. Importantly, dilution of
liability has been described as a problem that must be remedied:
the problem is inefficient precaution levels. When liability is di-
luted, the argument goes, often too little or too much care is tak-
en. The solution is described as an anti-dilution mechanism that
singles out and imposes liability on one or a few salient tortfeasors.
The focus of the literature has been both too narrow and too
broad. It is too narrow because dilution of liability is not limited
to alternative care situations, nor is it necessary for the damage
to be constant. The literature has been also too narrow because
[80:953958
dilution of liability is not always a "problem" that must be reme-
died. In deviation from the prior literature, Part II shows that
dilution of liability can increase welfare by facilitating a tortfest
that positively impacts activity levels. This is so even in the ar-
chetypical case-alternative care situations where the damage is
constant-where dilution of liability has been denounced.
Specifically, Part II identifies two types of tortfests. The
first type, discussed in Part II.A, is that of simultaneous tort-
fests. These are tortfests where a number of actors engage in a
damaging activity at the same time. Part II.A shows that in
simultaneous tortfests dilution of liability can increase welfare
by ameliorating a coordination problem between tortfeasors,
thereby allowing a harmful yet desirable activity to take place.
In doing so, Part II.A also contributes to the literature that
seeks to explain why the law imposes strict liability in nuisance
cases where the parties are clearly not at fault. In many cases, it
is clear that the injurers took care, even the utmost care, by em-
ploying the best and most recent methods of operation. Yet these
injurers are nevertheless subject to (strict) liability. Traditional
theory explains the need to impose liability (often referred as a
"liability rule") in high-transaction cost settings.10 When the ac-
tor and the would-be victim cannot negotiate, a liability rule al-
lows the actor to injure first and compensate later."1 In the face
of liability, the injurer would do so only if she expects a net gain,
that is, only if the expected benefits from the activity outweigh
the expected costs. Part II.A identifies a different form of cost
that explains why the law prefers a faultless victim over a fault-
less injurer. It shows that, even when negotiating with the vic-
tim is possible, a liability rule combined with a dilution mecha-
nism can alleviate a coordination problem between the tortfest
participants: the would-be buyers.
Part II.B analyzes successive tortfests. These are tortfests
where actors join an existing tortfeasor sequentially in time.
Part II.B shows that although successive tortfests can be welfare
enhancing, they may suffer from a free-riding problem. A marginal
cost-benefit analysis-the very one pressed by law-and-economics
champions-can exacerbate the problem to the point that a wel-
fare-enhancing tortfest will not take place. In some situations it
may even lead to welfare-decreasing tortfests. Part II.B discusses
10 See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law 43, 48-51 (Harvard 1987).
11 See text accompanying notes 61-62.
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a number of possible solutions. In doing so, it sheds light on an-
other debate: whether actual or prorated damages should be im-
posed in successive torts. Some jurisdictions employ a marginal
analysis holding each tortfeasor liable for the damage she
caused even in situations where it is hard, if not impossible, to
determine the damages caused by each tortfeasor. Other juris-
dictions apply a proration rule in these situations. Part II.B
adds to this debate by showing that it may be justified to prorate
the damage even when the damage caused by each tortfeasor is
clearly and easily ascertainable at no cost. Moreover, it shows
that, under certain circumstances, even a rule that imposes lia-
bility and subjects to damages actors who clearly did not cause
any harm can be justified. Part II.C discusses some of the possi-
ble objections to facilitating beneficial tortfests. These include
moral, legal, and economic considerations as well as alternative
mechanisms.
Part III examines the claim that dilution of liability is lim-
ited to situations where each actor can single-handedly avoid
the harm. This Part reveals, however, that the focus of the prior
literature has been misplaced, and it concludes that dilution of
liability can occur in a large number of settings. Part III also
shows that dilution of liability can positively impact precaution
levels. The Article concludes with final remarks.
I. DILUTION OF LIABILITY IN ALTERNATIVE CARE SITUATIONS
Dilution of liability has been described as a concern in situa-
tions of alternative care where any of the parties could have
avoided the damages. As the bystanders and restaurant exam-
ples show, dilution of liability can result in sub-optimal precau-
tion levels. Accidents that can and should be avoided by exercis-
ing due care won't be if liability is spread among too many
tortfeasors. In fact, dilution of liability can also result in
over-investment in precaution, as will be shown below. Either
distortion represents an inefficiency. The law has not ignored
these concerns. In fact, many tort doctrines have been explained
as remedies to the problem of dilution of liability in alternative
care settings, although not always explicitly so. Common to
these doctrines is an attempt to mitigate the concern of dilution
of liability by imposing liability on one salient tortfeasor.
960 [80:953
Consider then-Professor Guido Calabresi's example on the
effect of the comparative negligence defense.12 Assume together
with Judge Calabresi that an $80 accident can be avoided if the
victim or the defendant invested $60 in precaution. Under a
comparative negligence regime, assuming for simplicity that the
parties are equally (or 50 percent) at fault, neither will invest in
precaution. Because liability is split (or diluted), neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant will invest $60 in precaution to avoid
an expected loss of $40 (80/2). The solution is found in the sister
doctrine of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence
remedies the problem by imposing the entire burden on one par-
ty only.13 If the plaintiff is at fault she will be the only one bear-
ing the cost and therefore will purchase the precaution (60 < 80).
If she is not at fault, the defendant, now the sole party at fault,
will take precaution for the same reason.
Comparative negligence, at least under one interpretation
that has now been rejected, can also lead to over-investment in
precaution. Consider with Judge Richard Posner a situation in
which a $1,000 accident can be avoided by the defendant at a
cost of $100 or the victim at a cost of $50.15 Initially one may
conclude that under comparative negligence, and assuming for
simplicity again that parties are equally at fault, both will in-
vest in precaution (50, 100 < 500).16 The result is that an
12 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 158
(Yale 1970). For a critical view of Judge Calabresi's example, see Daniel Orr, The Supe-
riority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J Legal Stud 119, 119-20 (1991). Re-
cent scholarship analyzing the contributory and comparative defenses concluded that in
an ideal world of complete information (administrative issues aside) both regimes are
efficient. See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 14-17 (Harvard 1987);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 222 (Aspen 8th ed 2011); Oren Bar-Gill
and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 Am L & Econ
Rev 433, 434, 437-38 n 9 (2003); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit De Geest, The Fil-
tering Effect of Sharing Rules, 34 J Legal Stud 207, 210-11 (2005).
13 For a proposal to shift the entire burden to the injurer, see Bar-Gill and
Ben-Shahar, 5 Am L & Econ Rev at 437-38 n 9 (cited in note 12).
14 See id at 434, 437-38; Tai-Yeong Chung, Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A
Game Theoretic Analysis, 22 J Legal Stud 395, 395-96 (1993); Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law at 222 (cited in note 12).
15 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 219-20 (cited in note 12). See also Christo-
pher J. Robinette and Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which Is the Op-
timal Negligence Rule?, 24 NIU L Rev 41, 52 (2003).
16 This was indeed Judge Posner's initial conclusion but it was corrected in later
editions. Compare Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 124 (Little, Brown 2d ed
1977), with Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 220 (cited in note 12). See also Bar-Gill
and Ben-Shahar, 5 Am L & Econ Rev at 437 (cited in note 12); Chung, 22 J Legal Stud at
399 (cited in note 14). But see note 129 and accompanying text.
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accident that can be avoided at a cost of $50 will be avoided at a
cost that is 3 times higher. The inefficient result was thought to
be the work of dilution of liability.' As recent scholarship ex-
plains, "The reason that comparative negligence was thought to
generate inefficient incentives is that, by dividing the accident
costs among the parties, it provides incentives for both ... to ex-
ercise care."18 Contributory negligence was considered more effi-
cient because by singling out one party, the cheapest cost avoid-
er, the same accident would have been avoided at a cost of $50.
This conclusion, however, assumes that the law requires both
parties to take care in the above example. But if the standard of
care imposes a duty only on the cheapest cost avoider to take
care, then even under a comparative regime the efficient result
would occur. 19 The defendant will not have a duty to take care.
And knowing this, the victim-the cheapest cost avoider-will
invest $50 in precautions to avoid the $1,000 damage. Im-
portantly, under both interpretations the efficient result is
achieved by imposing liability on one party only, that is, by
adopting an anti-dilution mechanism.
The doctrine of indemnity functions in a similar way.20 It
"shifts the [entire] burden from one joint tortfeasor to another
who is better situated to avoid the accident, rather than dividing
it between the tortfeasors."21 Imagine, for example, that a $100
harm to the victim can be averted by A, a general contractor, at
a cost of $60 or by B, its subcontractor, at a cost of $55. Either
can avoid the damage, but it is clear that the preferred way
would be for B, the more knowledgeable party who was hired to
perform the task and the best cost avoider, to do so. But if the
damage is apportioned equally between the parties, neither will
take precaution (60, 55 > 50). If, on the other hand, the harm to
the victim can be avoided by B at a cost of $10 and the damage
is apportioned between the parties such that A is responsible for
75 percent of the damage and B for 25 percent, both will take
precaution (60 < 75, 10 < 25).22 Neither result is efficient. The
17 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 5 Am L & Econ Rev at 437-38 (cited in note 12).
18 Id at 437.
19 See id; Chung, 22 J Legal Stud at 399-402 (cited in note 14); Shavell, Economic
Analysis of Accident Law at 18 (cited in note 12); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at
220 (cited in note 12).
20 See Landes and Posner, 9 J Legal Stud at 519 n 5 (cited in note 2).
21 Dillbary, 62 Hastings L J at 1744 (cited in note 1).
22 See Landes and Posner, 9 J Legal Stud at 527-28, 532-37 (cited in note 2). For
the introduction of the effects of strategic behavior in this context, see id at 527.
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former case is one of under-investment in precaution whereas
the latter is one of over-investment. The two situations corre-
spond to the two examples provided by Judges Posner and Cala-
bresi in the injurer-victim context. It is therefore not a surprise
that indemnity employs a similar anti-dilution solution. In the
above example, it avoids dilution of liability and its ills-
inefficient precaution levels-by singling out one tortfeasor.
Even if the victim recovered her injury from A and B, A will be
able to indemnify from B, the "active" tortfeasor.23 Importantly,
Professor William Landes and then-Professor Posner explain
that indemnity is required only in alternative care situations.24
More recently, Professors Assaf Jacob and Alon Harel
sought to explain why tort law attributes liability primarily to
acts but not to omissions.25 They examine why, for example, by-
standers (usually) do not have a duty to furnish aid to a person
in need whereas a person who voluntarily takes an action may
be subject to liability under a theory of negligence.26 They con-
clude that this anomaly (imposing liability on those who act but
not on those who fail to act) can be explained as an attempt to
reduce the risk of dilution of liability. Once again, the authors
focus on alternative care settings. Relying on a variant of the
bystanders example discussed in the Introduction, they conclude
that if the law imposed a duty on all bystanders, requiring each
to take precaution, none would.27 If the law imposed liability on
four bystanders who can single-handedly avert a $100 harm at a
cost of $60, none would take care (60 > 25).28 But if instead the
law singled out one person, based on a simple salient feature,
the chosen one would take care and the harm would be avoided
(60 < 100).29 The salient feature can be the person who volun-
tarily decided to act (and thereby singled out herself), someone
with a special relationship with the victim (an easy-to-verify
sorting device), or the cheapest cost avoider (the economist's
23 See id at 533, citing Muth v Urricelqui, 60 Cal Rptr 166, 171-72 (Cal Ct App
1967).
24 Landes and Posner, 9 J Legal Stud at 532 (cited in note 2) (arguing that "the key
to understanding when indemnity will be allowed and when it will be denied is the eco-
nomic difference between joint-care and alternative-care situations"). For a survey of in-
demnity decisions, see id at 535.
25 Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 415 (cited in note 3).
26 Id. See also Jacob, 108 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 12-13 (cited in note 3);
Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 937-38 (cited in note 3).
27 Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 428-29 (cited in note 3).
28 See note 1 and accompanying text.
29 Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 429-30 (cited in note 3).
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choice).30 But it can also be a completely arbitrary feature, such
as singling out the blue-eyed or the tallest bystander.31 Indeed,
any salient feature that allows easy pre-selection of one actor
may solve the problem.82 Those who are not subject to liability
will not take care; the one who was singled out will take care to
avoid the crushing liability.
While the prior literature made a more modest claim, trying
to identify isolated examples where dilution of liability reduces
incentives to take care, Professors Jacob and Harel take a more
general approach. They explain that their insight on the differ-
ential treatment of acts and omissions in tort law is just "a
proxy" or an attempt to highlight a "broader phenomenon in tort
law, namely, the special treatment of multiple injurers in alter-
native care situations."33 In their view, dilution of liability merits
condemnation34 in (1) alternative care cases (2) where the dam-
age is constant and (3) liability is spread (or diluted) across a
large enough number of tortfeasors-conditions that are met by
the bystanders and restaurant examples.35 In these situations,
30 Choosing the cheapest cost avoider, albeit the most efficient solution, is not al-
ways feasible. In some cases, identifying that cheapest cost avoider can be a daunting or
even impossible task. In others, it would not solve the problem at all. (For example, if all
bystanders can avoid the accident at the same cost, choosing the cheapest cost avoider
cannot serve as a selective mechanism.)
3 Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 429, 432, 436 (cited in note 3). See also
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 5 Am L & Econ Rev at 437-38 n 9 (cited in note 12) (discuss-
ing a similar situation and noting that "[t]his [inefficiency] could be avoided, however, if
the law were willing to place the burden of care arbitrarily on one party (say, the injur-
er), even if both parties can prevent the harm at the same cost).
32 As noted earlier, the solution is imperfect. See note 4.
33 Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 414, 420 (cited in note 3). See also id at
414:
[Tjhe article interprets the differential treatment of acts and omissions in tort
law as a proxy for a more fundamental distinction between harms caused by
multiple injurers, where each one can single-handedly prevent the harm (ei-
ther by acting or failing to act), and harms caused by a single injurer (either by
acting or failing to act.
34 Id at 451.
35 Id at 414:
Attributing liability to too many injurers in alternative care situations leads to
dilution of liability. Since the overall cost to which a group of injurers is ex-
posed is constant, attributing liability to many injurers reduces the portion
each has to pay and, consequently, reduces the injurers' incentives to take
precautions.
id at 422:
Since the overall cost to which a group of tortfeasors in alternative care situa-
tions is exposed is constant, increasing the number of liable tortfeasors will re-
duce the compensation paid by each one and, consequently, each one's
they argue, the result is a suboptimal investment in precaution
and consequently a decrease in societal welfare. The solution:
imposing liability on one or few actors. 36
Professors Jacob and Harel make an important contribution
by providing a general methodology that explains the law's at-
tempt to curb some of the detrimental effects of dilution of liabil-
ity. Their conclusion, however, is both too broad and too narrow.
It is too broad because dilution of liability, even in alternative
care situations where the damage is constant-the archetypical
case that merits condemnation according to the authors--can be
desirable and if so, should be applauded, not condemned. It is
too narrow because dilution of liability is not limited to alterna-
tive care situations. Nor is it limited to situations where the
damage is constant.
II. TORTFESTS
In the bystanders and restaurant examples, no party want-
ed to bring about the harm. All were interested in avoiding the
accident and the liability that came with it. The parties would
avoid the accident if they could negotiate with each other.>< But
there are occasions when the parties are in fact interested in
combining and causing the harm to the victim and yet the acts,
which can be intentional or unintentional, are efficient even if
they give rise to liability. This Part analyzes such situations. It
shows that in some situations what is and should be condemned
if done by one (or a few) is socially desirable if conducted by
many. Moreover, this Part reveals that liability serves as a sort-
ing mechanism and that it should be imposed on actors of ineffi-
cient as well as efficient tortfests. In the former case, liability
has a deterring effect. In the latter case, liability enables an effi-
cient tortfest to take place, but only if the victim is compensated.
incentives to take precautions. Assigning liability to too many tortfeasors in al-
ternative care situations therefore will lead to dilution of the liability.
36 Id at 429.
37 This is not the case, however, with the campers. There, not taking precaution
was the efficient result even if transaction costs allowed the parties to negotiate. See
Introduction.
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A. Simultaneous Tortfests
1. Negligent tortfeasors and the coordination problem.
To see how dilution of liability can be desirable, consider
first the following example. Suppose a factory can avoid an ex-
pected damage of $800, the value of a neighboring lake, if it in-
vests $450 in a filtering device. Here, the factory will be held li-
able if it fails to take care, which is also the socially desirable
result (450 < 800). But assume now that instead of one factory,
two factories are located on the banks of a river that leads to the
lake. Note that the total expected damage does not increase with
the number of factories (that is, it remains $800, the value of the
lake). To ensure it is an alternative care situation,3" assume fur-
ther that the filtering device can only be placed on a section of
the river where the pollutants and debris from both factories
commingle so that any of the factories can avoid the entire dam-
age by installing a filter. As with one factory, efficiency requires
that the $450 filter be installed to prevent the expected $800
harm. Failing to take precaution would give rise to liability
against both factories since each can avoid the expected damage
of $800 by investing $450.39 Yet, neither factory will take
38 The assumption is not necessary and is later relaxed. See Part II.B.
3 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, illustrations 14-15 (stating that,
where there are multiple wrongdoers, a victim can recover the full amount of damages
from each tortfeasor or both); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm § 26, comments a, c, d, h; id at § 27, comments a, f, illustration 4; Rich-
ard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 Memphis St U
L Rev 45, 55-61 (1992) (noting that when a defendant's tortious behavior was sufficient
for the occurrence of the injury, as in the case where each of two defendants put enough
poison in the victim's drink to kill her, the parties are jointly and severally liable for the
entire harm); Brief Amici Curiae of American Law Professors in Support of Respondents,
Norfolk & Western Railway Co v Ayers, No 01-963, *13-18 (US filed Aug 19, 2002)
(available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1964118) ("Professors Brief); Richard W. Wright,
Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal
Responsibility, 54 Vand L Rev 1071, 1100-01, 1106-08 (2001). See also Velsicol Chemical
Corp v Rowe, 543 SW2d 337, 343 (Tenn 1976) (allowing a defendant accused of polluting
a park to implead five defendants who operated plants at the same area and holding that
"joint and several liability [applies] when an indivisible injury has been caused by the
concurrent, but independent, wrongful acts or omissions of two or more wrongdoers,
whether the case be one of negligence or nuisance); Landers v East Texas Salt Water
Disposal Co, 248 SW2d 731, 731-34 (Tex 1952) (imposing joint and several liability on
two defendants who independently but concurrently and negligently polluted the plain-
tiffs lake, killing the fish and rendering it useless); Phillips Petroleum Co u Hardee, 189
F2d 205, 211-12 (5th Cir 1951):
[W]here persons acting independently are guilty of negligence, and the results
of their negligence combine to set up a chain of causation resulting in the
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precaution because the cost of precaution outweighs the ex-
pected liability each factory faces (450 > 400). The expected lia-
bility and the incentive to take care will be diluted even further
if the number of tortfeasors increases. With n tortfeasors, the
expected liability each faces would be 800/n, which means that
in the case of 400 factories no one would take care even if the fil-
ter costs $3 (3 > 800/400).
Similar examples have been used by others to show the det-
rimental effects that result from dilution of liability.40 However,
missing in these examples is the fact that in inflicting harm in
the form of pollution, the factories also garner some benefits:
each makes a profit. The introduction of a profit analysis reveals
that dilution of liability can help incentivize actors to engage in
complained of damage, these persons ... are yet joint tort-feasors and, as such,
are liable for the damage caused by the conjunction of their separate negli-
gence, just as in collision cases, persons acting separately and independently
are none the less liable for the whole damage caused where their negligence
concurs to produce the result.
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 171 at 415 (West 2000); 61C Am Jur 2d Pollution Con-
trol § 1908 at 966-67 (2010) (noting that in some jurisdictions "when the acts of two or
more persons, although done independently, combine to cause pollution, those persons
are liable both jointly and severally for the resulting injury, particularly when the dam-
ages are indivisible'); Prairie Oil & Gas Co v Laskey, 46 P2d 484, 486 (Okla 1935):
If concurrent negligence of two or more persons combined together results in
an injury to a third person, they are jointly and severally liable and the injured
person may recover from either or all; the concurring negligence of one is no
excuse or defense to another; each is liable for the whole; even though another
was equally culpable, or contributed in a greater degree to the injury.
Michie v Great Lakes Steel Division, National Steel Corp, 495 F2d 213, 215 (6th Cir
1974) (a nuisance suit alleging that air pollutants from defendants' manufacturing
plants across the Detroit River combined and created a nuisance); Oakwood Homeowners
Association, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 258 NW2d 475, 484-85 (Mich Ct App 1977) (imposing
joint and several liability in a nuisance suit for pollution against a car manufacturer, a
petroleum refinery, a lime processing plant, and a salt company); notes 82-83 and ac-
companying text (discussing the imposition of liability in successive cases). But see Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 433A, illustration 5 (identifying circumstances in which
liability is apportioned based on the relative fault of the tortfeasors).
4o See, for example, Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 429 (cited in note 3).
The authors provide two examples of alternative liability situations involving actions (as
opposed to omissions) to show the detrimental effects of dilution of liability. In the first,
one hundred people each emit one spark, each of which is necessary together with the
other sparks to cause a fire. Id at 430. In the second, "several factories pollute the shared
water source, but it is only the accumulation of the pollution from all the factories that
causes significant damage to the water." Id at 430 n 39. In such cases, they argue "it may
be justifiable to excuse tortfeasors in order to prevent the risk of dilution of liability." Id.
The authors, however, do not discuss the effect of the profits to the tortfeasors (for exam-
ple, the factories). See also Jacob, 108 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 13 (cited in note
3) (providing an example with two polluting agents).
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certain "wrongful," yet welfare-enhancing activities, or as re-
ferred to here, tortfests.
This can be easily shown by assuming, for example, that
each factory profits $300 from the activity. As before, investing
in a filtering device is socially desirable (450 < 800). Yet, if one
factory alone is located on the lakeshores, it will not operate at
all. The fear of liability ($800) if it does not take precaution or
the cost of the filter ($450) if it does is enough to deter the facto-
ry, as both outweigh the expected profit ($300). With two facto-
ries, the analysis changes.41 Now, engaging in the activity and
taking precaution is the socially desirable result (450 < 300 x 2).
Note that here neither factory alone would be willing to pur-
chase the filter (450 > 300). Rather, to purchase the filter, the
parties must share its cost. This can be done if the parties agree
(or are forced) to do so, or if the law allows one factory to pur-
chase the filter ex ante and then force the other to share its cost
ex post.42 Absent such (voluntary or forced) cost-sharing mecha-
nisms and assuming again that coordination costs are high, the
parties will avoid the activity altogether. The result will be a
suboptimal activity level and a net social loss.43
TABLE 1. THE SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS FROM POLLUTING
Without Precaution With Precaution
Number of Total Total Net Total Net
Factories Benefits CostsfLoss Social Costs/Loss Social
Operating Gain/Loss Gain/Loss
Concurrently I
1 300 800 -500 450 -150
2 600 800 -200 450 150
3 900 800 100 450 450
41 The sequential analysis is discussed in Part II.B.
42 See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 Mich L Rev 189, 190-91 (2009) (proposing to modify current law to recog-
nize a regime of Expanded Duty of Restitution (EDR) under which "recipients would
compensate benefactors for unrequested benefits"); Jacob, 108 Mich L Rev First Impres-
sions at 12 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the EDR "provides an interesting and provoca-
tive solution to the dilution of liability puzzle").
43 The social loss is $150, the total profit of $600 (300 x 2) minus the $450 cost of
precaution.
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But if three factories engage in the tortfest, even if transac-
tion costs are high such that the parties would not (agree or be
forced. to) purchase the filter together, they would nevertheless
engage in the activity, because the gain for each would outweigh
their private expected cost (800/3 < 300). Here, dilution of liabil-
ity facilitates a desirable activity. Because the total cost remains
constant (the value of the lake is capped at $800), the expected
liability of each factory decreases as the number of tortfeasors
increases (800/n). Thus, if enough tortfeasors joined the tortfest,
an activity that was once socially undesirable (in the case of one
factory) would become desirable. Table 1 above summarizes the
results and shows how total welfare increases with the number
of tortfeasors.
The factory example is similar to the bystanders and res-
taurant examples in that, because the harm is constant, liability
is diluted as the number of tortfeasors increases. The factory ex-
ample, however, is fundamentally different. To begin with, in
the restaurant and bystanders examples, dilution of liability re-
sulted in an inefficient accident. Because liability was diluted,
no one took precaution and the result was a decrease in total
welfare. Dilution of liability was thus a problem that was reme-
died by imposing liability on one actor only. In the factory ex-
ample, on the other hand, dilution of liability is the solution. Di-
lution of liability allows a desirable and welfare-enhancing
activity to take place. It mitigates a cooperation problem be-
tween tortfeasors who, due to high transaction costs, cannot
combine to purchase the filtering device. The genius of this
mechanism is that dilution of liability incentivizes actors to join
the festivity in situations where the benefits from the joint activ-
ity outweigh the cost to the victim. If the number of actors is too
small, the crushing liability would deter the would-be tortfea-
sors from acting. Put differently, dilution of liability serves here
(again) as a sorting device that allows good accidents to take
place but deters bad ones.
Second, as in the campers example," dilution of liability al-
lows the courts to reach an efficient result by engaging in an in-
dividual cost-benefit analysis while freeing the courts from en-
gaging in the more complicated cost-benefit analysis of the
precautions, damages, and benefits. It also frees the courts from
4 See Introduction, notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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the daunting task of determining the exact number of actors
that renders the tortfest net beneficial. But while in the campers
example dilution of liability impacted the level of precaution,
here it impacts the activity level. In the factory example, dilu-
tion of liability ensures that, if the total benefit from the activity
outweighs the cost, the activity takes place. In the case of three
factories, an individual analysis will lead to a judgment against
each of the factories (450 < 800), but the dilution of their ex-
pected liability (800/3 < 300) would promote their operation.
Third, in the restaurant and bystanders examples, no actor
wanted the accident to occur. The bystanders, the restaurant
owner, and the gas provider would have all preferred to avoid
the accident if they could negotiate rather than be subject to lia-
bility. In the factory example, the opposite is true. The factories
have the incentive to participate in a tortfest with as many ac-
tors as possible.45
Finally, it is important to note that in the above example di-
lution of liability provides a second-best solution. Ideally, the
factories should purchase a filter if they decide to produce. This,
as Table 1 demonstrates, would increase total welfare from $100
to $450 in the case of three factories. As the next Section shows,
however, dilution of liability may even lead to a first-best
solution.
2. Liability without fault.
The examples thus far analyzed were situations in which
the actors were negligent. The bystanders, the campers, the res-
taurant suppliers, and even the factories all failed to take care
and for this reason they were found liable. But some activities
are so important (or beneficial) to society that the law allows
their operation even though they clearly come at a cost to inno-
cent parties. Power plant facilities, alternative energy (solar and
wind) plants, farming operations, and cement factories are but a
few examples of activities that often result in damage to others,
but their operation is tolerated.46 Yet, despite a trade-off that
45 If, for example, one hundred factories engaged in the tortfest, each would profit
$300, be subject to an expected liability of $8 (800/100), and therefore expect a net profit
of $292 (300 - 8). Total welfare would increase by $29,200 (300 x 100 - 800).
46 See note 8 and accompanying text; Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law
of Joint Torts, 73 Georgetown L J 1377, 1386 (1985) (noting that "it is far from clear that
one wants a world in which there is zero loss from toxics, given that the marginal costs of
prevention needed to obtain that situation are exceedingly high, while the last unit of
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favors the harming activity, even if the actors take the utmost
care that foresight and vigilance would require, the actors are
nevertheless labeled "tortfeasors" and are held liable.47
benefit is apt to be very low" and explaining that in some situations there is no way a
firm could avoid pollution "even if it tried, short of not generating or shipping wastes al-
together-which would mean the cessation of all manufacturing of such essential prod-
ucts as chemicals and food"). The Second Restatement also acknowledges this trade-off.
"A slaughterhouse," it notes, "may be indispensable to the community, but it usually
renders other land in its immediate vicinity unfit for residential use and enjoyment." Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 827, comment g. The operation of farms and factories "is
ultimately as essential to the general public good as the operation of hospitals and fire
departments." Id at § 828, comment e.
4 This is often the case under the nuisance doctrine. To somewhat simplify, a pri-
vate nuisance is a substantial invasion of another's interests in the use and enjoyment of
her land. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F. Liability in nuisance can be based on
negligence, or it may be based on a theory of strict liability if the defendant maintained
an abnormally dangerous activity. A third basis for liability, and the one of interest here,
is where the invasion is intentional and unreasonable. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 464 at
1324-25 (cited in note 39); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F; Copart Industries, Inc
v Consolidated Edison Co of New York, 362 NE2d 968, 971 (NY 1977):
[O]ne is subject to liability for a private nuisance if his conduct is a legal cause
of the invasion of the interest in the private use and enjoyment of land and
such invasion is (1) intentional and unreasonable, (2) negligent or reckless, or
(3) actionable under the rules governing liability for abnormally dangerous
conditions or activities.
To count as an intentional nuisance it is enough that the actor is "substantially certain
that his activities will cause" an invasion to the victim's land. Dobbs, The Law of Torts
§ 464 at 1324-25 (cited in note 39). I will is not required. Id at 1325; Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 825, comments c, d, illustration 2. Thus, where the damage is certain or
very likely to happen, exercising "extraordinary care," even using "the best technology
available" does not exempt the defendant from liability. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 464 at
1325 (cited in note 39). Professor Dan Dobbs explains that such intentional nuisance
'works as a soft version of strict liability." Id. See also Amore v Ohio Turnpike Commis-
sion, 955 NE2d 410, 414 (Ohio Ct App 2011) (analogizing nuisance to strict liability). The
intentional nuisance must also be "unreasonable," but what is "unreasonable" in nui-
sance is different than what is "unreasonable" in the tort of negligence. In negligence,
unreasonableness refers to the injurer's conduct. Liability is found if the injurer failed to
take care where she should. In nuisance, the term "unreasonable" refers to the harm to
the victim. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822, comment b; Dobbs, The Law of Torts
§ 465 at 1326 (cited in note 39); Smith v Jersey Central Power & Light Co, 24 A3d 300,
310 (NJ Super Ct 2011) ("[L]iability for negligence is based on a want of proper care,
while, ordinarily, a person who creates or maintains a nuisance is liable for the resulting
injury to others regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised to avoid such injury."),
quoting Monaco v Comfort Bus Line, Inc, 49 A2d 146, 149 (NJ Ct App 1946). An invasion
is unreasonable if "the gravity of the harm [to the victim] outweighs the utility of the ac-
tor's conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826. The invasion is also unreasonable if
"the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for
this and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not fea-
sible." Id. This test, like the gravity-utility analysis, ensures that the act is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient. In the face of liability that actor would engage in the activity only if the ex-
pected gain outweighs the expected loss.
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Madison v Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co4* is such a
case.49 In Madison, residents and owners of small farms, relying
on a nuisance theory, sought damages and injunctive relief en-
joining the operation of two copper plants that emitted large
volumes of smoke. The court found that the copper operations
interfered with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property, the
value of which was approximately $1,000.o Against this fact, the
court found that the plants conducted their business in a lawful
way5' and at appropriate locations;52 that they used "the only
known method by which these plants can be operated and their
business successfully carried on";53 that the method the plants
used was "the only method known to the business or to sci-
ence";54 and that the plants "ha[d] made every effort to get rid of
the smoke and noxious vapors," including an experiment con-
ducted by one of the defendants at a cost of $200,000 to that end
with no result.55 The court also found that the utility from the
plants' operations was substantial. The two plants accounted for
50 percent of the county's tax revenue and conducted an indus-
try upon which the entire population in the county was "practi-
cally dependent."5*
The first chancellor dismissed the plaintiffs' request to en-
join the defendants' operations. Despite the great value of the
defendants' activities, the Court of Chancery Appeals reversed
and issued a perpetual injunction.*7 The question before the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee was whether
in order to protect by injunction several small tracts of land,
aggregating in value less than $1,000, [the court should is-
sue an injunction that would stop] ... two great mining and
manufacturing enterprises, that are engaged in work of very
great importance, not only to their owners, but to the state,
and to the whole country as well, to depopulate a large
48 83 SW 658 (Tenn 1904).
49 See also Bliss v Anaconda Copper Mining Co, 167 F 342, 364 (D Mont 1909).
60 Madison, 83 SW at 666-67.
51 Id at 660.
62 Id at 660, 666-67 ('The defendants cannot reduce their ores in a manner differ-
ent from that they are now employing, and there is no more remote place to which they
can remove.").
53 Id at 660.
54 Madison, 83 SW at 660.
5 Id.
6 Id at 661.
57 Id.
town, and deprive thousands of working people of their
homes and livelihood, and scatter them broadcast.5*
The court answered in the negative. It explained,
[I]f the injunctive relief sought [were to] be granted, the de-
fendants will be compelled to stop operations, and their
property will become practically worthless, the immense
business conducted by them will cease, and they will be
compelled to withdraw from the state. It is a necessary de-
duction from the foregoing that a great and increasing in-
dustry in the state will be destroyed, and all of the valuable
copper properties of the state become worthless.59
The court refused to issue an injunction against the defend-
ants in light of their great social value which, it believed, out-
weighed the harm they caused the victims. Yet, despite the fact
that the defendants were clearly not at fault, and despite the
fact that they had taken all possible precautions, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held them liable, labeled them as tortfea-
sors, and recognized the victims' right for damages.60
The result is puzzling. If society is interested in such opera-
tions, why should the operators be liable for harm they caused
but could not avoid? Put differently, between the two faultless
parties, the innocent victim and the actor from whom society
commissioned (or acquiesced to) an operation knowing that by
doing so it invites a harm, why should the actor bear the
burden?
The law-and-economics literature explains the imposition of
liability in high-transaction cost settings that prevent a deal be-
tween the injurer and the victim. Nuisance reduces transaction
costs between a would-be seller and a would-be buyer by allow-
ing the injurer (the would-be buyer) to pollute first and compen-
sate the victim (the would-be seller) later. The conclusion is of-
ten backed by examples involving a single injurer and a single
5s Madison, 83 SW at 666-67.
5s Id at 660.
60 Id at 662. The court concluded that "there can be no doubt" that the plaintiffs
proved a nuisance that entitled them to damages. Id. It explained that in nuisance cases
a judgment of damages is "a matter of absolute right." Id at 664. An injunction, on the
other hand, is discretionary and will not be given where damages can adequately com-
pensate the victim. Id at 662.
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victim,61 or one injurer and multiple victims, to illustrate the
holdout concern that may prevent a transaction.62
Dilution of liability can shed some light on this issue and
help clear some of the confusion between nuisance and negli-
gence.68 In no-fault liability cases, dilution of liability may play
an important role. It helps bring about cost-efficient operations
in settings where high transaction costs between the tortfeasors
themselves are prohibitive. By facilitating beneficial tortfests,
dilution of liability can help maintain the very delicate but often
hard to measure trade-off that society engages in.
To illustrate, suppose that as before a factory, call it Fl, is
located next to an $800 lake and that over a certain period of
time the factory expects to gain $300, but that in doing so it will
completely destroy the lake. Assume further that no known
methods can mitigate or avoid the harm; only stopping the activ-
ity will. F1 will thus be liable (perhaps under a theory of negli-
gence64 but more likely under a nuisance regime65) because the
61 See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics
17-27 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed 2011) (providing an excellent overview on the tort of nui-
sance); Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 43, 48-51 (cited in
note 10).
62 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 78 (cited in note 12); Po-
rat, 108 Mich L Rev at 192-93, 201-03 (cited in note 42).
63 On the difference between the prior literature on nuisance and the explanation
offered in this Article, see text accompanying notes 10-11; notes 71-72 and accompany-
ing text.
64 Taking precaution usually means that one must drive slower or purchase a safe-
ty device such as a filter without changing the activity levels: the number of miles driven
or the number of units produced. But an actor may be found negligent for not altering
her activity levels, for example, when the benefits from the activity are very slight com-
pared to the loss generated by the activity. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 226
(cited in note 12); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 297, comment a:
A reasonable man would recognize that there is an inescapable risk in driving
down a narrow and illkept mountain road, winding along precipices unguarded
by walls or railings, particularly if rain, snow, or ice has rendered the road
slippery. The mere use of such a route under the circumstances described may
be negligent unless the utility of the route is very great.
65 See McFarlane v City of Niagara Falls, 160 NE 391, 391-92 (NY 1928) (Cardozo)
(holding that "[o]ne who emits noxious fumes or gases day by day in the running of his
factory may be liable to his neighbor though he has taken all available precautions... .
He is not to do such things at all, whether he is negligent or careful"); Bell v
Gray-Robinson Construction Co, 62 NW2d 390, 392-93 (Wis 1954) ("A nuisance does not
rest on the degree of care used ... but on the degree of danger existing even with the
best of care."); Pennoyer v Allen, 14 NW 609, 613 (Wis 1883) (holding that in nuisance
cases "it is no defense to show that such business was conducted in a reasonable and
proper manner," but rather, "[it is the interruption of such enjoyment and the destruc-
tion of such comfort that furnishes the ground of action"); Jost v Dairyland Power Coop-
erative, 172 NW2d 647, 652 (Wis 1969) ("[A] continued invasion of a plaintiffs interests
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benefits from shutting down the facility and avoiding the $800
damage clearly outweigh the opportunity cost: forgoing a gain of
$300. If a second identical factory, F2, joins the festivity concur-
rently, both will be held jointly and severally liable for the indi-
visible harm.66 Because each factory's expected liability would be
$400 (800/2), $100 more than the benefits each garners from the
activity ($300), neither would engage in the polluting activity
(400 > 300). The result would be to deter both factories from the
activity.
Unlike the example discussed in Part II.A.1, deterring F1
and F2 from engaging in the polluting activity is socially desira-
ble.67 With two factories there is an expected net social loss of
$200: the total expected benefit is $600 (300 x 2) compared to
the $800 expected loss from destroying the lake. But if a third
factory, F3, joined the festivity, things would be different. Now
the expected benefits from the joint activity would outweigh the
expected damage (800 < 900). And because liability is diluted-
each factory faces an expected liability of only $267 (800/3)-all
factories would now be willing to engage in the activity
(267 < 300).r8
by non-negligent conduct, when the actor knows of the nature of the injury inflicted, is
an intentional tort, and the fact the hurt is administered non-negligently is not a defense
to liability."); Smith, 24 A3d at 310 ("[A] defendant's conduct may be found to have con-
stituted a nuisance even though the conduct has sufficient social utility to be considered
reasonable so long as damages are paid to the party whose use and enjoyment of land
has been interfered with by this conduct."); Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co, 257 NE2d 870,
875 (NY 1970).
66 See note 31.
67 In the example provided in Part II.A. 1 and summarized in Table 1, the best solu-
tion for the two factories was to produce and invest (together) $450 in precaution that
would save the lake, thereby bringing total welfare to $150 (300 x 2 - 450). As noted,
however, absent some voluntary or forced cooperation neither party would do so alone
(450 > 300).
68 Here, liability is imposed on the actors although the total benefit from the activi-
ty outweighs the loss. See Boomer, 257 NE2d at 875 (awarding damages to neighbors of
a polluting factory but denying an injunction); Smith, 24 A3d at 310; King v Columbian
Carbon Co, 152 F2d 636, 641-42 (5th Cir 1945):
As a concession to industrial progress and social utility the law will not abate a
useful and lawful enterprise even though it be a nuisance, but ... [i]t still re-
quires payment for unwarranted, unreasonable, and substantial damage done
to the property of another which is caused by the construction and operation,
however skillful, of an industrial plant in a locality undevoted and unadapted
thereto.
Comar Oil Co v Hackney, 250 P 93, 99-100 (Okla 1926) (acknowledging that defendants,
oil companies, could not by any means prevent the pollution of a creek that neighbored
with the plaintiffs' lands, but ordering defendants to compensate the victims despite a
finding that the pollution was done knowingly although without malice). See also note 65.
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Here, dilution of liability brings about the most efficient re-
sult, a first best. It ensures that the faultless parties would en-
gage in the activity when the total expected benefits from their
combined activities outweigh the total expected cost of their op-
eration. By holding all actors strictly liable, the law helps ensure
that the societal trade-off is net positive and that welfare-enhancing
activities are allowed, and it does so at low cost. Instead of en-
gaging in the daunting task of measuring the total costs of all
operations and comparing those costs to the expected benefits, it
leaves the analysis in the hands of the market players. It shifts
the decision making and the error that comes with it to the tort-
feasors. If the tortfeasors believe that their activities are worth-
while, they will build their polluting facilities and pay the price
(in the form of liability) that comes with it. If they are wrong,
they will be subject not only to liability, but to such a crushing
liability that it would result in a net private loss.69
3. Group wrongdoing and (no) moral indignation.
A tortfest enabled by dilution of liability comes with addi-
tional benefits. First, the actors-tortfeasors would have the in-
centive to cluster around the same lake and act in concert. To
use a term that rings moral indignation, they would have an in-
centive to combine and engage in group wrongdoing. A large
enough number of tortfeasors will dilute the expected liability
each faces and ensure that taking the risk to operate is worth-
while by increasing the expected net benefits each tortfeasor
garners from the activity. In the above example, if there are
three factories, each will expect a gain of $33.33 (300 - 800/3)
whereas if there are 100 factories, each will expect a gain of
$292 (300 - 800/100).
A tortfest, if facilitated by a cooperative mechanism (for ex-
ample, regulation), may also incentivize the parties to innovate
and invest in cost-reducing technologies and devices, as doing so
would increase their profits even further. In the example above,
the parties would be willing to invest $100 to develop a filtering
device that would avoid the damage to the lake, even if such a
device, once developed, would cost $600. Between facing a total
liability of $800 (the value of the lake) and spending $700
69 In the above example, if two factories decide to operate, they will incur a net loss
(400 > 300), but if a third factory joins the festivity, each of their respective operations
will become profitable even in the face of liability (800 < 900, 267 < 300).
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(600 + 100) on precaution that would save it, the latter is a clear
winner.
Moreover, the actors would also have an incentive to find
the "best location" for their operation where location is im-
portant. An isolated location far from any residential neighbor-
hood, or one that is amenable to current or future preventative
technologies, would allow the tortfest members to reduce their
expected liability and increase their profits.
A tortfest may also ensure that an essential activity takes
place. Building on the above example, assume that three cement
factories are required to satisfy the demand for construction. If
each of the factories is located next to a different lake, the result
would be a net social loss (800 x 3 > 300 x 3). Here, producing
cement cannot be justified, which means that society would have
to forgo the construction of skyscrapers and modern housing.
Congregating around two lakes would be welfare decreasing for
the same reason (800 x 2 > 300 x 3). However, the demand for
cement can be satisfied without decreasing societal welfare if
the three factories operate in the same vicinity, thereby ensur-
ing that the $800 cost from destroying a single lake is justified
by the $900 (aggregate) benefit from the activity. Here, the lake
is sacrificed for the greater good. It is a necessary evil that must
be accepted in a modern society, and both private and social in-
terests are aligned to bring about this result.70
A tortfest, even if done intentionally with full awareness of
the damage that would accrue, should therefore not subject the
tortfeasors to punitive damages if it is welfare enhancing. It
should be applauded and promoted, not condemned. This is es-
pecially the case in strict liability cases where all parties, the
victim and the injurers, are faultless. The fact that the victim is
compensated may also bring some comfort to those who are con-
cerned with distributive justice. By subjecting the tortfest par-
ticipants to liability and, at the same time, ensuring that such
liability is diluted, the law promotes efficient activities while
compensating the injured.
70 For types of pollutants that may justify the aggregation of polluting agents, see
Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79 U Chi L Rev 985, 1022 (2012) (discussing the con-
ditions under which "bunching," a strategy of exposing a few to large amounts of pollu-
tion, and "spreading," a strategy of exposing many to small doses of pollution, can miti-
gate or even eliminate the harm from pollution without reducing the total amount of
pollution).
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This mechanism would be sabotaged if the parties to an effi-
cient tortfest were subject to punitive damages.71 Punitive dam-
ages, if set high enough, would serve as an effective anti-dilution
mechanism but would be welfare decreasing. In the example
above, setting the damages at $1,600, only twice the actual
damage, would halt the activity. The three factories that would
operate and fully compensate the victim for her damages if sub-
ject to compensatory damages (800 < 900) would be deterred
from operating if subject to punitive damages (1,600 > 900). Pu-
nitive damages are often justified to ensure that transactions in
low-cost settings are channeled to the market.72 But in the facto-
ry example, transaction costs may be high, and not just between
the seller (the would-be victim) and the buyers (the would-be
tortfeasors), as often discussed by the literature on nuisance, but
between the tortfeasors themselves. Dilution of liability reduces
these coordination costs by providing each actor with an indi-
vidual incentive to engage in the tortfest.
B. Successive Tortfests
1. The marginal analysis and the free-riding problem.
The previous Section focused on concurrent tortfests. Re-
gardless of the number of factories that engaged in the tortfest,
the assumption was that all actors joined the festivity at the
same time. This Section extends the analysis to situations where
one actor engages in a harmful activity and others join the ini-
tial tortfeasor sequentially in time. It shows that in some situa-
tions, a marginal analysis can play a similar role to the one
played by dilution of liability in the concurrent tortfest, but that
strategic behavior may jeopardize the occurrence of successive
71 The intent requirement is satisfied if the defendant acts or creates a condition
with a specific purpose to harm the victim. But ill will or malice is unnecessary. Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 825, comment c. A nuisance is intentional if the actor is
"substantially certain" that his activities will cause an invasion to the victim's land. Id
(explaining that "[i]t is the knowledge that the actor has at the time he acts or fails to act
that determines whether the invasion resulting from his conduct is intentional or unin-
tentional" and noting that the actor "must either act for the purpose of causing it or
know that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his conduct"); id at
§ 825, comment d, illustration 2 (providing an example of an intentional invasion even
when the actor did not desire to harm the victim).
72 See, for example, the arsonists example discussed in notes 113-23 and accompa-
nying text. There, the threat of ex post punitive damages incentivizes the actors to nego-
tiate with the victim and purchase her car using the market.
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welfare-enhancing tortfests. In other situations, a marginal
analysis can be welfare decreasing.
To analyze a successive tortfest, assume that a factory lo-
cated next to the $800 lake gains $100 from its activity and that
in doing so it causes $400 in damages even if it exercises the
utmost care. For simplicity, assume that the damage is caused
immediately when the factory begins its operation. Under tradi-
tional tort theory, the first factory, Fl, would be found liable be-
cause the costs from the activity outweigh its benefits
(400 > 100) and would therefore be deterred from acting in the
first place. Assume for a moment that despite the net loss of
$300, Fl decides to engage in the activity and suppose that iden-
tical factories are opening their gates at the lakefront sequen-
tially in time.7 The second factory, F2, is liable for the same rea-
son Fl is. F2's operation caused an incremental damage of $400
(bringing the total damage to $800) compared to a benefit of
$100 (400 > 100). But the third factory, F3, will be exempted
although each factory releases the same amount of pollutants
into the lake. The reason is simple. Because the maximum harm
that can be done to the lake is capped at $800 (the value of the
lake), as the number of actors increases, at some point the activ-
ity of the additional (or marginal) actor will come at no cost. In
our example, once F1 and F2 brought destruction upon the lake,
F3 contributed nothing to the damage. By the time F3 joined the
tortfest, the lake was already destroyed (its value was
800 - 400 - 400, or 0). F3's activity therefore yielded a $100 gain
at no additional cost.
The result is a tortfest.74 The marginal analysis-holding
each actor liable for the damage it caused-incentivizes actors
(F3 and those that may follow it) to join the festivity because
their polluting activity will not subject them to liability.
The tortfest is efficient ex post. Once the lake is ruined, re-
quiring F3 to stop its activity would be socially undesirable
73 The assumption is relaxed below. See notes 80-90 and accompanying text. In the
next Section, it is shown that a rule that could subject all tortfeasors to liability for the
entire harm but would allow the liability of each actor to be diluted could in fact incen-
tivize F1 to engage in the activity.
74 Note that the marginal analysis employed in the successive tortfest treats identi-
cal actors differently. While in a simultaneous tortfest dilution of liability subjects all
actors to liability, in the sequential tortfest the first actors are liable while those who
join later in time are exempted. In the example, Fl and F2 are liable but F3, the subse-
quent (marginal) tortfeasor, enjoys the fact that the value of the asset harmed was com-
pletely diminished by the time it started operating because of its predecessors' wrongful
acts.
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because it would impose a cost (the loss of $100 from the activi-
ty) with no redeeming benefits. Put differently, once F1 and F2
operate and destroy the lake, the costs they inflicted are "sunk"
and the operation of any additional factory is justified. But ex
ante the tortfest is welfare decreasing: with three factories, the
marginal analysis exempts F3 from liability although a total
cost-benefit analysis, the one used to determine the social value
of the entire tortfest, reveals a net social loss of $500: the differ-
ence between the $300 (100 x 3) gain from the combined activity
and the $800 aggregate damage to the lake.
However, this welfare-decreasing tortfest will become social-
ly desirable if more factories follow suit. For example, with sev-
en additional factories (F3-F9), the total number of actors would
reach nine and total welfare will increase by $100 (100 x 9 -
800), with eight additional factories (F3-F10) by $200, and so
on. The results are described in Table 2 below.75
TABLE 2. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS FROM POLLUTION
Factory Marginal Total Marginal Total Net Social
Cost Cost Benefit Benefit Gain/Loss
(polluting) (activity)
F1 400 400 100 100 -300
F2 400 800 100 200 -600
F3 0 800 100 300 -500
F7 0 800 100 700 -100
F8 0 800 100 800 0
F9 0 800 100 900 100
F10 0 800 100 1000 200
But the desirable tortfest (with a total of nine or more facto-
ries) may never occur. It was assumed earlier that F1 and F2
(and those who follow them) will engage in the activity, but this
is unlikely. To see why, consider again the effect of the marginal
75 The factories' and society's interests in clustering around the same lake are
aligned. If the factories are split between two lakes of the same value, the result would
be a decrease in welfare of $600 (1,000 - 800 x 2) because the same aggregate gain from
the activity would come at twice the cost. The eight additional factories (F3-F10) thus
have an interest in joining the festivity, thereby increasing the total number of factories
to ten. In doing so, the newcomers not only would gain a private benefit, but the activity
as a whole would become a desirable one (800 < 1,000).
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analysis. The eight factories that join the festivity (F3-F10) are
not exempted because they are better or more efficient than F1
or F2. By definition all factories are identical. F3-F10 are ex-
empted from liability simply because they were at the right
place at the right time. They came to the lakefront after the sec-
ond factory started its operation. Had any of these factories op-
erated first or second in time, they would have been found liable.
And here lies the problem. No factory would want to be the first
or the second in time. None of the factories wants to be the one
who takes a possible hit and paves the way for future actors that
would escape liability simply because they came later in time.
Each factory will therefore delay its activity until at least two
factories start their operation, the result of which is suboptimal
activity level and a net social loss.
. This can be shown using a prisoner's dilemma-like model.
To simplify, assume that two potential factories must inde-
pendently decide in Period 1 whether to enter the market or not
(assuming, again, that cooperation is impossible). Assume also
that a factory that engages in the activity will gain $500 but in
doing so it will destroy the $800 lake. If both parties decide to
enter in Period 1, each will expect a net gain of $100 (500 -
800/2)76 and societal welfare will increase by $200 (1,000 - 800).
If one factory enters in Period 1 but the other does not, the en-
trant will be held liable for the entire damage and lose $300
(500 - 800). The party who decided to wait would be able to en-
ter in Period 2, after the lake was already destroyed, and enjoy a
benefit of $500. If both entrants decide to wait, no harm is done
but no benefits are yielded. The expected payoffs of the parties
are summarized in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3. THE PAYOFF MATRIX OF TWO FACTORIES (Fl, F2)
F2
Enter in Period 1 Wait
F1 Enter in F1 F2 F1 F2
Period 1 100 100 -300 500
Wait F1 F2 F1 F2
500 -300 0 0
76 For simplicity, the analysis in this Section ignores additional benefits that a par-
ty may garner from entering first, such as interest or a competitive advantage. Such
benefits are incorporated in Part II.B.2.
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A comparison of the payoffs reveals a dominant strategy to
avoid entry. If F2 enters in Period 1, F1 is better off waiting
(500 > 100) and if F2 waits, F1 is also better off waiting
(0 > -300). F1 is thus better off waiting regardless of F2's deci-
sion. The same holds for F2. Each factory will therefore wait for
the other to destroy the lake first, hoping to enter second and
thus profit from the activity.
In fact, the problem is worse. Even if the activity of each
factory alone is profitable and socially desirable, it is not clear
that any of the factories will engage in the welfare-enhancing
activity. To see why, assume that if a factory enters the market,
its activity will destroy the $800 lake but will yield a total profit
of $900. Here, private and social welfare are increased by the ac-
tivity (800 < 900) and therefore F1 may decide to enter in order
to realize the $100 profit; in which case F2, the subsequent tort-
feasor, will surely join it in the second period and realize a profit
of $900. But if the two factories need to decide in Period 1 whether
to enter or not, things may be tricky and the welfare-enhancing
tortfest may not occur at all. If the two factories enter the mar-
ket at the same time, each can expect a net benefit of $500, the
difference between the $900 benefit from the activity and the
(diluted) expected loss of $400 (800/2). If one enters the market
in Period 1 and the other does not, the entrant will destroy the
lake, compensate the victim, and still enjoy an expected net prof-
it of $100 (900 - 800). The second will enter the market in Peri-
od 2 and will enjoy an expected profit of $900. The expected pay-
offs of the parties are summarized in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4. THE PAYOFF MATRIX OF TwO FACTORIES (Fl, F2)
F2
Enter in Period 1 Wait
F1 Enter in F1 F2 F1 F2
Period 1 500 500 100 900
Wait F1 F2 F1 F2
900 100 0 0
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There is a pronounced advantage to being the second to op-
erate77 but there is no clear strategy. It is thus unclear what will
happen, but if both factories decide to wait the result will be an
expected net social loss of $1,000 (900 x 2 - 800).78
In sum, a sequential tortfest is less likely to occur even if it
is welfare enhancing, and if it does occur, it may result in a net
social loss. One solution discussed earlier is to allow or create
mechanisms that will, in some situations, facilitate group
wrongdoing or help the factories to coordinate their activities.79
If the ten factories would build their facilities on the lakefront at
the same time, no one would be in the losing position of F1 or
F2, and all will operate. Zoning and other forms of regulations
may achieve this result. Part II.B.2 below shows how a liability
rule combined with a dilution mechanism can, in some situa-
tions, achieve the same result that an agreement would achieve
but without requiring such agreement.
2. In search of additional solutions.
a) Treating successive torts as concurring. Allocating
damages in situations where a number of tortfeasors caused a
single harm can be impossible.80 The harm is often indivisible,
and the traditional causation "but for" test may fail.81 Revert
77 The factory that waits will gain $900 if the other factory enters in Period 1 com-
pared to $500 if both operated in Period 1 or $100 in case it operates in Period 1 and the
other in Period 2.
78 Social welfare may be reduced even when both actors are committed to entering
the market. Assume for example that the actors can enter in Period 1 or Period 2 and
that if a party enters in Period 2, because of the delay, it will profit only $800 (instead of
$900 had it entered in Period 1). In this case if both factories wait each factory can ex-
pect a payoff of $400 (the difference between the $800 profit from the activity minus the
$400 (800/2) expected liability from destroying the lake). The payoffs in the lower right
cell of the matrix (wait-wait) will thus be: [400, 400] (instead of [0, 0]). If one actor enters
in Period 1 and the other in Period 2, the former will enjoy a gain of $100 (900 - 800) and
the latter a gain of $800. The result would be a dominant strategy to enter in Period 2
and thus a social loss of $200.
79 See notes 63-69 and accompanying text (illustrating how dilution of liability
helps solve the coordination problems of tortfeasors). See also Part II.A.3.
s0 Velsicol, 543 SW2d at 342:
The requirement of "indivisibility" can mean either that the harm is not even
theoretically divisible, as death or total destruction of a building, or that the
harm, while theoretically divisible, is single in a practical sense in that the
plaintiff is not able to apportion it among the wrongdoers with reasonable cer-
tainty, as where a stream is polluted as the result of refuse from several
factories.
81 The quintessential example is that of two tortfeasors each carelessly starting a
fire that could alone destroy the victim's house. Neither tortfeasor can be said to be the
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again to the factory example. Can it really be determined what
damage was caused by the first factory to act in a successive
tortfest? Can the damage be distinguished from that caused by
the other factories? What if some factories started operating at
the same time (in which case each factory is the "marginal" fac-
tory) or joined the activity at different times? What if the facto-
ries produce different widgets and use different methods of
manufacture-making the task of ascertaining the damage
caused by each even more complicated? Or consider an accident
involving four cars, each harming the victim sequentially in
time and causing an indivisible harm. Here, it is clear that each
driver caused a separate harm, but how can the fact finder de-
termine the marginal contribution of the several drivers?82
Jurisdictions are split in their treatments of successive torts
causing an indivisible harm.83 Some courts treat successive torts
as concurring, subjecting each of the parties to liability for the
entire damage, regardless of the actual harm caused, based on a
theory of joint and several liability.84 Others apply a marginal
"but for" cause of the accident. How can it be argued that but for the careless behavior of
one, the damage would not have occurred, where it clearly would because of the other's
careless actions? Courts apply in such situations the "substantial factor" test. See, for
example, Anderson v Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co, 179 NW 45, 46 (Minn 1920).
See also Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Contribution
Model, 25 Envir L 549, 561 (1995); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, comment i.
82 See Waller v Skeleton, 212 SW2d 690, 696 (Tenn Ct App 1948) (holding that
where successive impacts with different negligently operated vehicles combined to cause
the victim's injury, each of the tortfeasors is jointly and severally liable for the entire
damage). See also Swan v Andrew Crowe & Sons, Inc, 434 A2d 1008, 1010 (Me 1981)
(applying joint and several liability for an indivisible injury caused in the course of two
successive employments).
83 See Paul Homer, Comment, Indivisible Injury Negligence and Nuisance Cases-
Proving Causation among Multiple-Source Polluters: A State-by-State Survey of the Law
for New England, and a Proposal for a New Causation Framework, 3 Pierce L Rev 75,
81-94 (2004).
84 See, for example, Phillips Petroleum, 189 F2d at 212:
[Where the concurrent or successive acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently of each other, are in combination, the direct or
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to de-
termine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible
for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the en-
tire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the act of the other
tort-feasor.
Prairie Oil & Gas, 46 P2d at 485-86 (allowing joinder of defendants whose independent
and successive acts polluted the plaintiffs creek, causing it an indivisible damage and
holding that "each is responsible for the entire damage").
analysis under which each tortfeasor is severally liable for the
additional damage it caused85
Understanding tortfests can shed new light on and enrich
the apportionment debate. While the prior literature focused on
whether the harm is divisible or not86 and whether each tortfea-
sor should be liable for the entire harm or only for a portion
thereof,87 this Article highlights a different consideration. In de-
viation from the prior literature, it shows that even if the harm
is divisible and easily ascertained, treating successive torts as
concurring ones can be beneficial. This Section builds on the in-
sight discussed previously: that a marginal analysis can serve as
an effective anti-dilution mechanism that can block beneficial
tortfests. Conversely, a uniform treatment under which each
tortfeasor is liable for the entire harm can lead to the formation
of a large pool of defendants and, with the help of an appropriate
dilution mechanism, can mitigate the free-riding problem that
plagues successive tortfests and enable beneficial tortfests.
To see how treating a successive tortfest as a concurring one
can solve the free-riding problem, consider the following exam-
ple. Suppose that each of two factories can gain $500 from an ac-
tivity, but doing so would cause damage of $600 to a neighboring
lake, the value of which is $800. To simplify, assume further
that the factories must operate next to the lake (perhaps, be-
cause of its proximity to a specific input) and that operating ear-
ly in time confers an additional benefit of $1 (for example, the
accrued interest on the profits or a first-mover advantage). Here,
if both factories start their operations at the same time, each
would expect a profit of $101 (500 - 800/2 + 1). If one starts in
the first period and the other joins in the second period, the first
would expect a loss of $99 (500 - 600 + 1) and the second would
85 See William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal L Rev 413, 432-
34 (1937) ("If two defendants, independently operating the same plant, pollute a stream
over successive periods, it is clear that each has caused separate damage, limited in
time, and that neither has any responsibility for the acts of the other.").
86 See note 80.
87 See note 82; Wright, 23 Memphis St U L Rev at 59 (cited in note 39) (noting that
in "situations, when there are theoretically separable injuries attributable to distinct
causes, but it is difficult or impossible to actually distinguish ... the injuries or their
causes, the modern trend has been to hold each defendant .. . jointly and severally liable
for all the injuries"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 881; id at § 433A. But see Boston,
25 Envir L at 561, 568-69 (cited in note 81) (noting that the comments in the Restate-
ment § 433A "fail to provide consistent application" and that the example regarding suc-
cessive injuries is unclear); Megan P. Duffy, Note, Multiple Tortfeasors Defined by the
Injury: Successive Tortfeasor Liability After Payne v. Hall, 37 NM L Rev 603, 611 (2007).
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expect a profit of $300, the difference between the $500 profit
and its liability for the remaining marginal damage of $200. The
expected payoffs of the parties are summarized in Table 5 below.
TABLE 5. THE PAYOFF MATRIX OF TWO FACTORIES (Fl, F2)
F2
Enter Wait
F1 Enter F1 F2 F1 F2
101 101 -99 300
Wait F1 F2 F1 F2
300 -99 0 0
As demonstrated in Part II.B.1, under these circumstances,
no factory would engage in the activity. Each would rather wait,
hoping the other factory would engage in the activity in the first
period, destroy most of the lake, and allow the joining factory to
enter in the second period and profit $300. This is the result of
the marginal analysis. But while in the prisoner's dilemma, con-
fessing-an action that contradicts each actor's interest but ben-
efits society's-was the result, here the result is a net social loss
of $200 (1000 - 800). Society's and the actors' interests are
aligned. All would be in favor of conducting the activity.
Now consider a rule under which every tortfeasor is liable
for the entire harm caused by him and others but liability is di-
luted, for example, based on a prorated basis (that is, the dam-
age is shared among the tortfeasors equally). I refer to this rule
as the Entire Harm Rule (EHR).88 In the case of the two facto-
ries, each would be liable for one half of the damage. In this sit-
uation one factory clearly pays more than the damage it caused
and the other pays less. The first to produce would be liable for
$400 although it caused a damage of $600, and the second would
be liable for $400, although it caused a damage of $200. The
88 For a similar yet different suggestion that ignores the traditional causation test,
see Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, 36 J Legal Stud
63, 64 (2007) (proposing a rule to control social costs in situations where the individual
harm caused by each participant is unobservable, under which each participant in the
activity is responsible for all of the excessive harm that everyone causes and defining
excessive harm as "the difference between the total harm caused by all injurers and the
optimal total harm). The EHR is different in that it subjects all actors to the aggregate
harm. Moreover, the EHR is meant to apply in situations when the individual harm is
observable and can be determined easily and at low cost.
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expected payoffs of the parties under the EHR are described in
Table 6 below.
TABLE 6. THE PAYOFF MATRIX OF TWO FACTORIES UNDER THE
EHR (Fl, F2)
F2
Enter Wait
F1 Enter Fl F2 Fl F2
101 101 101 100
Wait F1 F2 Fl F2
100 101 0 0
Under the EHR, both parties will engage in the activity in
the first period. Waiting entails no benefits. In fact, under the
assumptions it will entail a loss (at the very least the loss of in-
terest or of being the first mover). Put differently, changing the
rule turned a free-riding problem, where each is waiting for the
other to enter into a race to be the first to produce.8* Moreover,
although under the EHR one tortfeasor may pay more than the
harm it caused and the other may pay less, both parties would
be better off.
The conclusion is that, even when the damage caused by
each tortfeasor is divisible and easily ascertainable, avoiding a
marginal analysis (where it can be employed) may be beneficial.
Moreover, turning a successive tortfest into a concurrent one
may also confer the benefits discussed earlier. Here, it creates a
low-cost individual incentive scheme that mimics a concerted ef-
fort that, combined with a dilution mechanism, mitigates the
concern that the tortfest would be welfare decreasing.
It is important to acknowledge that the EHR is not a perfect
solution. Consider, for example, a variant of the factory example
in which F1 and F2 gain $500 and $350 respectively from the ac-
tivity, but a factory that operates will cause $600 of damage to
the $800 lake. As before, if carried by both factories the activity
will be welfare enhancing (800 < 500 + 350), but it will not take
place because of the free-riding problem. Here, the EHR will not
89 Note that, with some simplifying assumptions, the result is not dependent on
whether the apportionment regime is one of joint and several liability or one that impos-
es several liability. See Dillbary, 62 Hastings L J at 1757-60 (cited in note 1). In the
above example, the expected liability of each is the same: 50 percent of the damage
whether the parties are severally or jointly and severally liable for the entire damage.
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remedy the problem. Under the EHR, if both operate each will
be liable for half of the damage: $400 (800/2). This would allow
F1 to operate profitably (400 < 500) but not F2 (400 > 350). The
result is that none of the parties would operate (knowing that F2
will not operate F1 will not operate either) although efficiency
requires that they do. This problem would be mitigated and even
remedied if more tortfeasors join the activity. The cost savings
from using the EHR, which is easy and cheap to administer,
may also justify the imperfections in its application. Other
mechanisms may also mitigate the problem. For example, Pro-
fessor Ariel Porat's Expanded Duty of Restitution (EDR) pro-
posal (discussed in the next Section), albeit limited in scope,
would allow the tortfeasors that paid the victim earlier in time
to recover from future members of the tortfest. It is important to
note that in some situations, as in the case of a mechanism that
allows parties to join the activity sequentially, there may be ad-
ditional concerns. For example, if the injured victim brings a
suit before enough tortfeasors join the activity to render it wel-
fare enhancing, an injunction or an early verdict may serve as
an anti-dilution mechanism, as would punitive damages. Here,
courts may need to consider if a tortfest is in the making and be
aware of possible strategic behavior.90
b) Imposing liability on non-harming actors. While the
previous Section shows that imposing liability unrelated to the
harm caused can be beneficial, this Section takes the analysis
one step further. It shows that even a rule that imposes liability
on actors that did not cause any harm to the victim can be wel-
fare enhancing.
To see how imposing liability on non-harming actors can be
helpful and even invited by those subject to liability, recall the
example summarized in Table 3. There, each factory could gain
$500 if it engaged in the activity, but in doing so it would com-
pletely destroy the $800 neighboring lake. Under these condi-
tions, neither of the actors would elect to operate although effi-
ciency mandates that they do (800 < 1,000). They would not
operate because the marginal analysis serves as an effective an-
ti-dilution mechanism that deters the actors. But consider now a
rule under which liability is imposed on all actors on a prorated
basis (that is, the damage is shared equally by all actors) even if
O Note that simply delaying the suit to allow more tortfeasors to join the festivity
may create another free-riding problem. A sequential actor may prefer to wait for others
to join the activity first and be subject to liability before it would agree to operate.
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they did not cause any harm. Assume also that operating earlier
confers an additional benefit of $1. Under this version of the
EHR, if one decides to enter first and the other to wait, the first
entrant would be liable for only $400 although it caused $800 of
damage. The second to operate would be liable for $400 although
it did not cause any damage (the lake was already destroyed by
the first). The expected payoffs of the parties under these condi-
tions are described in Table 7 below. Under this rule, each actor
has a dominant strategy to enter. Entering ensures the actor an
expected gain of $101. Waiting may result at most in an ex-
pected gain of $100 or with no profits and is therefore an inferior
strategy.
TABLE 7. THE PAYOFF MATRIX OF Two FACTORIES (Fl, F2)
F2
Enter Wait
Fl Enter F1 F2 F1 F2
101 101 101 100
Wait F1 F2 F1 F2
100 101 0 0
Here, a rule that imposes liability on the actor that clearly
did not cause any damage and allows its dilution was beneficial
to all. The creation of a pool combined with a dilution mecha-
nism enabled a desirable tortfest, thereby increasing total wel-
fare by $202 (1,002 - 800). It incentivized both parties to operate
early in time and benefited society by providing a valuable
product. The tortfest allows both actors to realize private bene-
fits they could not gain under traditional tort theory.
Even if a facilitating mechanism would allow the tortfest to
take place in a sequential manner, the result can be justified.
The liability imposed on the non-injuring party can be viewed as
the "price" the subsequent tortfeasor is willing to pay to engage
in a tortfest. After all, it would not join that tortfest if it were
not willing to pay that price. The imposition of liability is also
justified on fairness grounds because although the second to op-
erate did not cause any harm, it engaged in an activity that
would be damaging had it acted earlier in time. That the first to
operate pays less than the damage it caused can also be justified
by the fact that the first to operate undertook to identify a suit-
able location for the tortfest (and took the risk that others would
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not follow suit). Proponents of corrective justice should also be
appeased at least in that the victim is compensated and may
even benefit from the activity as would society at large.
C. Objections
This Section addresses a few of the objections that may be
raised against a rule facilitating beneficial tortfests. It is im-
portant, however, to start with a clarification. This Article does
not argue that all tortfests are beneficial. In fact, it fully
acknowledges that some tortfests are harmful. Rather, this Arti-
cle only seeks to highlight a situation that has not received at-
tention by the literature and encourage the consideration of
rules that will allow welfare-enhancing tortfests. With this ca-
veat in mind, this Section turns to discuss some of the objections
to allowing tortfests.
1. The moral argument.
Allowing, even actively facilitating, wrongdoing provokes
strong moral indignation. Moreover, some of the solutions dis-
cussed impose disproportional liability on the actors. Some ac-
tors are liable for more than their "share," others for less, and
yet a third group of actors may be subject to liability for harms
they did not cause at all. Yet, the moralist should be aware that
all actors have engaged in the activity. In the example above, all
actors polluted, although it may be that with regard to some
their pollution did not cause any damage to an already de-
stroyed lake. It is thus only the timing in these examples that
led to a certain distribution of the harm among the actors. In
fact, a tortfest that pools the actors and treats them equally for
the harm caused by a similar activity seems like a "fair" result.
Yet, others would be concerned by the fact that a tortfest, by
definition, allows too large a number of tortfeasors to do what a
few would be dissuaded from doing. The group festivity, howev-
er, comes with a liability rule. It would be one thing to allow the
tortfest and exempt its participants from liability, but this is not
the case. Liability plays an important role here. Not only does it
compensate the victim (a "side effect" that may be appealing to
those who are concerned with corrective justice), but it also cre-
ates a sorting mechanism and enriches the pool of liable actors
by situating all tortfeasors on the same footing and then allow-
ing each actor's liability to be diluted. The result is an increase
in total welfare that would benefit society at large.
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Moreover, the moralist should recall that it was society that
commissioned and commended the harm. Power plants, cement
operations, sewage reservoirs, and landfills are necessary parts
of modern life. Unfortunately, they also come at a cost that we,
as a society, believe is worth paying because the value from
these operations outweighs the harm caused. Tortfests can be
viewed as an extension of the trade-off society made. Labeling
actors who engage in this activity "wrongdoers" is also unjusti-
fied. They are wrongdoers as a practical matter because they
cause a harm for which the law prescribes a remedy in the form
of damages (but not an injunction). But they are also the agents
that serve their principal: society.
2. The economist's concern.
The economist, even if persuaded that group "wrongdoing"
can be beneficial, may raise a different concern. That tortfests
can be efficient does not eliminate the possibility that there are
other means by which the same results can be achieved and at a
lower cost. The Article has no quarrel with this argument. Its
purpose, as noted earlier, is twofold: (1) to highlight that dilu-
tion of liability can be beneficial and serve as a sorting mecha-
nism and (2) to encourage the consideration of rules that would
increase welfare-enhancing tortfests. If the same result can be
achieved by better, more efficient means (for example, regula-
tion), such means should be adopted.
Moreover, regulation and other mechanisms can aid benefi-
cial tortfests, and if so, and if cost justified, they should be
adopted. One such mechanism was recently proposed by Profes-
sor Porat. Professor Porat proposes a change in the law that
would recognize an EDR. Under the proposed regime, when cer-
tain conditions are met, "recipients would be obliged to compen-
sate benefactors for unrequested benefits ... [based on] the low-
er of two measures-either the indisputable benefit gained by
the recipients or their relative share of the reasonable costs of
producing the benefit."91 To illustrate the operation of the EDR,
assume with Professor Porat that constructing a park on A's
land at a cost of $15 would confer a benefit of $10 upon A, the
owner, and a benefit of $10 upon B, a neighbor.92 Although build-
ing the park is socially desirable (15 < 10 + 10), A will not invest
91 See Porat, 108 Mich L Rev at 194 (cited in note 42).
92 Id at 191.
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in its construction because her private benefits are outweighed
by the cost of construction (15 > 10). Under Professor Porat's
EDR proposal, however, A will build the park because she will
be able to recover 50 percent ($7.50) of the cost of construction
from B, thereby increasing her total benefits to $17.50. The re-
sult is a net social and individual gain for both A and B.93
Professor Jacob argues that the EDR "provides a solution to
the problem of dilution of liability."94 He illustrates his point us-
ing a similar example where A and B pollute a river thereby
causing an expected harm of $100, which can be avoided if ei-
ther installs a filter at a cost of $60. He concludes that "in-
stalling the filter is the socially optimal decision," but neither
will do so because for each expected liability is diluted to $50
(100/2), which is less than the cost of the filter.95 The EDR would
allow A to purchase and install the filter because it would be
able to share the cost of the filter (30 < 50).
The conclusion can be justified, but only if there are benefits
from acting. If there are no benefits from pollution, the "optimal
decision" is to avoid the damaging activity altogether. Pollution
in Professor Jacob's example yields no benefit, only a cost,
whether of $100 if no filter is installed or of $60 if it is. But a so-
lution of "no activity" means no cost at all and is therefore pref-
erable. What is missing is a benefit analysis. The EDR can solve
the problem in the case of the bystanders where each has noth-
ing to gain but the victim (and society) loses if no one takes ac-
tion. But the factories are different than the bystanders. As dis-
cussed earlier, factories are for-profit entities, and once the
benefits from their operation are introduced, the analysis
changes. Assume for example that each factory makes a profit of
$40. Here, one factory will not engage in the activity at all be-
cause the damage or the cost of the filter, if one is not installed,
outweighs the benefits (100, 60 > 40). If transaction costs are
high, two factories would not operate either, but three would.96
With three participants, the expected liability of each would be
diluted enough to make the activity worthwhile (100/3 < 40). Di-
lution of liability is therefore not always a "problem." It can be a
solution. But as explained in Part II.A.1, in these circumstances
it is only a second-best solution. Ideally, the tortfest participants
9s A would profit $2.50 (17.50 - 15), and so would B (10 - 7.50).
94 Jacob, 108 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 14 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
95 Id at 13.
96 See the example in Table 1 in Part IIA.1.
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would collaborate to purchase the filter, and the EDR can indeed
help bring the precaution level to an optimum.
Professor Porat's EDR can complement the dilution mecha-
nism already provided by the law, but it is of limited scope. It
seems that its major application is in situations where the par-
ties need to take care, but it does not apply in situations where
the parties took care yet are liable under a theory of strict liabil-
ity.97 Moreover, as the campers examples8 shows, even when it
comes to precaution levels, in some situations, dilution of liabil-
ity can result in optimal levels where other mechanisms, EDR
included, cannot. This can occur where efficiency requires that
the parties do not take care at ally. Dilution of liability may en-
joy a few additional benefits: instead of forcing the beneficiaries
to share the costs, dilution of liability allows the beneficiaries to
decide whether they want ex ante to engage in the activity and
thus be subject to the sharing mechanism provided by the dilut-
ed liability; or whether they want to opt out and avoid acting.
Dilution of liability also avoids some of the measuring problems
as it rolls the decision to each actor to decide if it is beneficial
enough for it to join the activity.
Finally, it seems that the EDR is limited to situations where
the beneficiary is salient. For instance, in the owner-neighbor
example it is clear that one party is the benefactor and the
neighbor is the "recipient."0oo In simultaneous situations, howev-
er, when the parties are aware of each other but cannot observe
who, if any, takes care, the EDR-a solution that was designed
to solve a free-riding problem1o-may in fact create one. To see
why, consider the following variation of an example provided by
Professor Porat to illustrate the operation of the EDR.102 Assume
97 A broad interpretation of the EDR-under which one factory will try to recover
from another the benefits of being second-is possible, but it is not clear that such a
broad interpretation, even if adopted by state legislators, would be more cost effective.
98 See Introduction, notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
99 In the campers example, a camper values his or her activity at $50 but must in-
vest $40 in precaution or the fire that would result would (either alone or combined with
other fires) destroy the victim's $90 cabin. See Introduction, Part III.B. For the reasons
explained below, with three or more campers efficiency requires that none takes care. A
mechanism that would require or force the parties to take care would thus be welfare
decreasing.
100 Porat, 108 MVich L Rev at 190-91, 206 (cited in note 42).
101 Id at 205-06 (noting that in free-riding situations "an EDR is most essential for
fostering private production of public goods currently not being produced").
102 Id at 206-07. The example, referred to as Example 2, discusses a situation in
which X creates pollution that affects residents and A, one of the residents, can stop by
(a) paying X, (b) taking costly precaution (the subject of the example above), or (c) suing
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a factory inflicts a damage of $50 on each of residents A and B (a
total of $100) that can be avoided by any of the residents at a
cost of $60. In this example neither resident will take care
(60 > 50) although society would be better off if A or B (but not
both) took precaution (60 < 100). Professor Porat correctly notes
that A "will not make the necessary effort at stopping the pollu-
tion ... unless she is able to collect from the other residents at
least part of her costs."10 The result would be under-investment
in precaution.104 But the EDR may result in under- or over-
investment.105 For example, an EDR that allows each resident to
take care and then recover from the other may result in both
residents taking care and lead to a social waste of $20 (60 x 2 -
100).106 Professor Porat's EDR solution cannot solve an alterna-
tive care situation where multiple actors must decide whether to
take care without observing each other's actions. For this rea-
son, the EDR is not an adequate solution for simultaneous
tortfests.107
for injunction. Professor Porat explains that the example "represents [a] typical case in
which free riding subverts the efficient creation of benefits." Id.
103 Id at 207.
104 Game theory would lead to the same result. If both residents take care, each
would spend $60 on precautions, and if neither takes care, each would suffer a loss of
$50. If one takes care and the other does not, the resident that takes care will lose $60,
and the resident that does not will not suffer any loss. The result is a dominant strategy
not to take care (if B takes care, A is better off not taking care, and if B does not take
care, A is also better off not taking care (-50 > -60) and vice versa). Under an EDR re-
gime, if one takes precaution and the other does not, each would bear half of the cost of
precaution: $30 (60/2). The result is multiple equilibria in which one party takes care
and the other does not, but it is impossible to predict how the parties will behave. In-
deed, it is possible that neither or both take precaution.
105 See Porat, 108 Mich L Rev at 207 (cited in note 42) (showing that under the EDR
neither or both residents may take care).
106 The problem does not arise if A asks for an injunction or pays the factory to cease
operation-in both cases, it is clear that A is the benefactor and B the recipient.
107 For example, assume with Professor Jacob that either factory A or factory B can
avoid the $100 damage at a cost of $60. Jacob, 108 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 13-
14 (cited in note 3). But now also assume that each factory can benefit $80 from the ac-
tivity. Here the activity is welfare enhancing (80 > 60, 50), but neither will take care be-
cause the expected liability of each is diluted below the cost of precaution (60 > 50). The
result is thus under-investment in precaution. Professor Jacob is correct that an EDR
would incentivize the actors to take care by providing a right of reimbursement, but the
EDR may lead to over-investment if both take care. Moreover, if strategic behavior is
considered, the result is ambiguous. If both parties take care, each will expect a profit of
$20 (80 - 60), and if none takes care, the expected profit will be $30 (80 - 100/2); but if
one takes care and the other does not, under the EDR each will expect a gain of $50 (80 -
60/2). The result is multiple equilibria in which one takes care and the other does not,
but it is impossible to predict the factories' actions.
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3. The examples.
The stylized examples used in the Article may also raise ob-
jections. In the simultaneous tortfest it is assumed that each ac-
tor knows or believes that a large enough number of tortfeasors,
even if not visible, engage in the activity such that her liability
would be diluted enough to provide her with an independent in-
centive to act. This may be true in some settings but not in oth-
ers. In addition, the Article does not analyze situations where,
for example, the care function is continuous or situations where
the probability of the accident or the magnitude of the harm
changes with the number of actors. As noted earlier, the goal of
this Article is modest. The goal is not to show that dilution of li-
ability is always welfare enhancing (it is not). Rather, the pur-
pose of this Article is to highlight a gap in the literature, name-
ly, that dilution of liability can be welfare enhancing. The
Article does so by following the methodology and building on
some of the examples provided by the prior literature to show
that dilution of liability can be beneficial. In doing so it hopes to
reinvigorate and spark further investigation of the phenomenon
as courts do impose liability which is diluted.
It should be noted, however, that although the prior litera-
ture, and accordingly this Article, focused on alternative care
situations where the damage is constant, dilution of liability is a
broader phenomenon. For example, it is easy to show that dilu-
tion of liability can occur even if the damage increases with the
number of tortfeasors as in the case where the first tortfeasor
causes $100 in damages, the second increases the total damage
to $150, the third to $170, and the fourth to $180. In this situa-
tion the expected liability of each tortfeasor is diluted with every
additional actor (from 100 to 75 to 56.67 to 45). Similarly, as
shown in Part III below, dilution of liability can occur in settings
other than alternative care.
4. Measuring concerns.
In the above examples, the value of the destroyed asset-the
cabin in the campers example, the car in the bystanders exam-
ple, and the lake in the factory example-was measurable. But
in real life, things may be more complicated. The court may un-
derestimate the value of the victim's asset. And even if the vic-
tim's asset is correctly valued, the damage may not cover the full
cost of the accident. In the factory example, the real harm may
include the value of the lake as well as the depreciation in air
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quality and other environmental concerns that may not be easily
verifiable. Albeit a real concern, the measuring problem does not
change the analysis. Assume for example that the harm from
the factories is the destruction of the $800 lake as well as an en-
vironmental damage that is ten times higher: $8,000. Still, if
acting is beneficial, there will be a point that with enough facto-
ries the benefits would outweigh the gain. If each factory gains
$300 from the activity, then with 30 factories the activity will
become welfare enhancing (30 x 300 > 8,800). As long as the full
damage is internalized by the actors, the result does not change.
5. Antitrust law.
One of the solutions offered to solve the coordination and
free-riding problems that plague tortfests was to facilitate and
create mechanisms to allow actors to combine, cooperate, and
coordinate a group wrongdoing. One can envision a form of regu-
lation that would reduce the transaction costs of potential actors
and result in an agreement to cooperate. This, one may argue,
runs the risk of violating federal antitrust laws and, in particu-
lar, Section 1 of the Sherman Act,10 which prohibits collusion
and agreements in restraint of trade. However, a tortfest, even
one which is the result of an agreement, should not raise any
antitrust concerns if it is done by actors who do not compete in
the same product market. In the examples above, F1 could have
been a cement factory, F2 a power plant, and so on.109 Moreover,
even if the actors are members in the same industry,1xo antitrust
law allows competitors, under certain situations, to collabo-
rate.", Such situations include research and development ef-
forts, standard setting, as well as cost-reducing joint ventures.
These agreements, even when done between horizontally situat-
ed actors, do not restrain trade. They enhance it, and for this
reason, they are subject to a rule-of-reason analysis. A tortfest
that allows a number of actors to collaborate and orchestrate a
10 Ch 647, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 et seq.
109 See, for example, Oakwood Homeowners Association, 258 NW2d at 476, 484-85
(imposing joint and several liability in a nuisance suit for pollution against a car manu-
facturer, a petroleum refinery, a lime processing plant, and a salt company).
110 See, for example, Farley v Crystal Coal & Coke Co, 102 SE 265, 266 (W Va 1920)
(describing how six different coal-mining companies located on the same river polluted
the plaintiffs property).
111 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations among Competitors (Apr 2000), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04
/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2013).
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welfare-enhancing yet harmful activity should be allowed for the
same reason. It simply does not make any sense to use the anti-
trust machinery to condemn what tort law, in the name of socie-
ty, commends.
III. BEYOND ALTERNATIVE CARE
A. Dilution of Liability as a Concern
The salience literature narrowly limits its discussion to al-
ternative care situations where the damage is constant. For ex-
ample, to show that dilution of liability is a concern only in these
situations, Professors Jacob and Harel contrast the bystanders
examplell2 with a situation involving arsonists. In the arsonists
example, a number of defendants, each holding a torch, set the
victim's car on fire.11s Professors Jacob and Harel explain that
the difference between the two cases is not between omission
(failing to take care) and commission (using a torch).114 The dif-
ference, they argue, is that "[u]nlike the [bystanders] example,
the torch hypothetical is not an alternative care situation."115
While the authors are correct that the arsonists example is
different because it is not an alternative care situation, they are
mistaken in concluding that dilution of liability is a concern only
in alternative care situations. It is true that unlike the bystand-
ers example one arsonist alone cannot avert the damage. As the
authors note, 'The car could have been damaged by any one of
the individuals holding a torch."116 The arsonists example is thus
not an alternative care scenario. Rather, it belongs to a class of
cases in which each tortfeasor's conduct is an independent and
sufficient cause of the injury. However, even in the arsonists ex-
ample, dilution of liability is a concern. The expected liability of
each arsonist decreases as the number of tortfeasors increases.
With two arsonists and assuming the value of the car is $100,
112 See notes 1-3, 26-32 and accompanying text.
11a Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 430 (cited in note 3).
114 Id (noting that
what can explain the difference between this case [the arsonists example] and
the case of the failure to extinguish the fire [in the bystanders example] is the
fact that the latter involves an omission (failure to use a fire extinguisher)
while the former involves an act (use of a torch)
but immediately dismissing this explanation because it "is too hasty an answer and ig-
nores a fundamental difference between the two cases").
115 Id.
116 Id.
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the expected liability of each arsonist would be $50. With four
arsonists, the expected liability of each would decline to $25.
Interestingly, a similar example was discussed by Professor
Richard W. Wright in an attempt to prove that joint and several
liability is a superior apportionment regime to that of several li-
ability.117 Instead of arsonists, Professor Wright gave an example
of four tortfeasors, each of whom deliberately put a drop of poi-
son in the victim's cup.118 It would be "silly," he argued, to say
that each of the defendants is only "25% negligent" as several li-
ability requires.119 In Professor Wright's view, the result is "per-
verse"120 because "the more tortfeasors there [are], the less liable
each would be, although the tortious behavior of each [tortfea-
sor] remain[s] constant and [is] an actual and proximate cause
of the plaintiffs entire injury."121
117 Wright, 23 Memphis St U L Rev at 56-57, 60-61 (cited in note 39). To the extent
that Professor Wright concludes that an apportionment regime of several liability can
result in dilution of liability and therefore is inferior to a regime of joint and several lia-
bility, the conclusion is faulty. Dilution of liability can occur under a regime of joint and
several liability as well as a regime of several liability. In fact, dilution of liability can
occur under any apportionment regime. See Dillbary, 62 Hastings L J at 1743-44 (cited
in note 1); Mark M. Hager, What's (Not!) in a Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liabil-
ity Apportionment, 33 Conn L Rev 77, 103 (2000).
118 In Professor Wright's example, three drops were necessary to kill the victim but
this does not change the analysis: each of the tortfeasors will be subject to liability.
Wright, 23 Memphis St U L Rev at 57 (cited in note 39). See also Part II.A.1.
119 Wright, 23 Memphis St U L Rev at 56 (cited in note 39).
120 Id at 57. Professor Richard A. Epstein explains how apportionment of damages
can lead to a different "perverse" result-that of dilution of benefits (as opposed to liabil-
ity). Epstein, 73 Georgetown L J at 1385 (cited in note 46). Consider the following vari-
ant of Professor Epstein's example. Suppose that a dumpsite that receives toxic waste
from one factory causes a $2,000 damage to a neighboring victim and that 50 percent of
the damage can be avoided at a cost of $400. Here, the factory will take precaution. In-
vesting $400 will reduce the factory's liability from $2,000 to $1,000, a savings of $600.
Assume now that ten factories dump their toxic waste to the same site, bringing the total
damage to $20,000. Investing $400 to reduce the damage from $20,000 to $19,000 is still
efficient (1,000 > 400). Yet, now the original factory will not take care. The reason is a
collective action problem: The original factory would be the only one that bears the $400
cost of precaution while the benefits therefrom would be shared with all the tortfeasors.
In a group of ten tortfeasors, taking care would reduce the total cost to $19,000 (20,000 -
1,000) and each factory's expected share to $1,900 (19,000/10) making the investment of
$400 unprofitable (400 > 100). Here, the problem is not dilution of liability. It is true that
liability of each tortfeasor is diluted, but the problem is the dilution of the benefits from
taking precaution.
121 Wright, 23 Memphis St U L Rev at 57 (cited in note 39). Wright refers to this
"perverse" situation as a "tortfest." Id. This Article, however, uses the term "tortfest" to
describe a situation that is more than just dilution of liability. It defines "tortfest" as a
situation where dilution of liability incentivizes the parties to engage in the "wrongful"
activity.
Both the arsonists and the poisoned-drinker examples, how-
ever, are flawed. When tortfeasors engage in an intentional act,
they garner some benefit from inflicting the harm.122 To see how
dilution of liability can occur in such situations, assume that the
value of the car that was set on fire is $100 and that each of the
four arsonists was willing and able to pay $60 in the form of a
fine, compensation, or a fee to inflict the harm. Each of the ar-
sonists would be deterred if acting alone (60 < 100), but if part of
a group of four, they would set the car on fire because their indi-
vidual (expected) liability would be diluted (60 > 100/4). Dilution
of liability in this case operates in the same manner as it does in
the bystanders hypothetical in the sense that, in both cases, it
reduced the parties' incentives to take care. The only difference
is the remedy. While in the bystanders case the remedy is an an-
ti-dilution mechanism in the form of singling out one tortfeasor,
in the arsonists example the car is spared by imposing punitive
damages on the intentional tortfeasors.123
B. Dilution of Liability as a Remedy
The categorical condemnation of dilution of liability in al-
ternative care situations is also too broad. Even in the narrowly
identified cases in which the prior literature concluded that dilu-
tion of liability is a "problem," a "risk," and a phenomenon that
is "disharmonious with the very essence of the concept of liabil-
ity" and should thus be "condemned,"124 dilution of liability can
be desirable. Sometimes, dilution of liability may actually be a
remedy.
Recall the campers example discussed earlier, which is in
essence a variant of the arsonists example. In the campers ex-
ample, if a number of campers in a heavily forested area fail to
extinguish their campfires, the several fires will join and destroy
the victim's cabin, which lies in the valley below the forest.125
Assume that the campers cannot cooperate and that any single
122 For a model of intentional torts, see Landes and Posner, 9 J Legal Stud at 531
(cited in note 2).
123 For those who are concerned with efficiency, this case is, at least on its face, puz-
zling, as the four arsonists together clearly value the car more than its owner
(60 x 4 > 100). Still, the "taking" of the car (by setting it on fire) is inefficient because it
is merely an attempt to bypass the market in a setting where transaction costs are low.
It is therefore condemned for the same reason that a theft cannot be justified even when
the thief values the stolen artifact more than its owner.
124 Harel and Jacob, 3 Theoretical Inq L at 414, 421, 427, 436, 451 (cited in note 3).
125 See note 9 and accompanying text.
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fire can destroy the cabin, the value of which is $90. Each camp-
er can avoid setting a fire if she spends $40 on care and each is
willing and able to pay $50 for the right to camp. In the case of
two campers, economic efficiency and the law26 require that
each of the campers engage in the activity (40 X 2, 90 < 50 X 2)127
and that each take care (40 x 2 < 90). Game theory predicts that
this is exactly what the campers will do. If both take care, each
spends $40 and can expect a net gain of $10 (50 - 40), but if nei-
ther takes care, the expected gain for each will only be $5 (50 -
90/2). If one party takes care and the other does not, the party
who takes care can expect a gain of $10 (50 - 40) and the one
who does not can expect a net loss of $40 (50 - 90). By taking
care a camper ensures that she gains $10. If, on the other hand,
the camper does not take care she may gain $5 (if the other
camper does not take care) or lose $40 (if the other camper does).
Each camper is therefore better off taking care regardless of
what the other does. Taking care is thus a dominant strategy as
is also shown by the expected payoffs matrix in Table 8 below.
TABLE 8. THE CAMPERS' PAYOFFS FROM TAKING CARE
(CAMPER 1, CAMPER 2)
C2
Take Care No Care
Cl Take Cl C2 C1 C2
Care 10 10 10 -40
No Care C1 C2 C1 C2
-40 10 5 5
With three campers, however, the analysis changes. As in
the arsonists example, if no one takes care, all will be jointly and
severally liable for the entire harm because each camper's con-
duct is an independent and sufficient cause of the injury.12 Yet,
126 See Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 171 at 415 (cited in note 39) (discussing a similar
example and noting that "the two tortfeasors who set the two different fires are both
causes of the plaintiffs harm, provided only that each fire was sufficient standing alone
to cause the same harm').
127 The activity yields a total benefit of $100 (50 x 2), which is higher than the $90
total cost to the victim if the campers do not take care or the $80 (40 x 2) total cost of
precaution if they do.
128 The example is based on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm § 27, comment a, illustration 1, and Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433A, comment i, illustrations 14-15.
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although each party is still liable (40 < 90), none will take pre-
caution. Taking care would yield an expected gain of $10 (50 -
40). But without care each camper's expected liability would be
diluted to $30 (90/3) and her expected gain would double: $20
(50 - 30). Unlike the arsonists example, however, here the result
is efficient. Because the total cost of precaution outweighs the
damage (120 > 90), we do not want the parties to take care. Put
differently, the accident is cost justified. Taking care yields an
expected benefit of $30 (150 - 40 X 3) but failing to take care
would double the expected benefits (150 - 90).
The puzzle here is why are the three campers liable at all?129
The reason is the inability to distinguish between accidents that
are not cost justified (those caused by one or two tortfeasors in
the example above), and those that are value maximizing. Re-
quiring courts to engage in an individual, as well as total, cost-
benefit analysis is not an easy task. It is one thing to ask courts
to compare the cost of a specific individual's possible precaution
to the harm that will result if the specific precaution is not tak-
en, a formidable task in and of itself. It is quite another thing to
ask the courts to also check whether the total costs of a number
of possible precautions taken by different individuals outweigh
the damage they caused and compare those to the individual
and aggregate benefits from the actors' actions (all of which may
vary across actors). The latter analysis may be harder to con-
duct and is more likely to be rife with mistakes.1SO Sorting a
cost-justified accident from an inefficient one also requires the
courts to be able to identify the exact moment where an addi-
tional investment in precaution by the marginal actor would be
inefficient. At that moment, all actors should be exempted from
liability. Identifying that moment may be costly, if not impossi-
ble; and an error would only add to these costs.
Dilution of liability, on the other hand, can serve as a simple
mechanism to avoid the measuring and sorting problems. Liabil-
ity is imposed as a first step on all actors based on an individual
cost-benefit analysis to ensure that parties take the optimal lev-
el of precaution when the accident is inefficient. In the second
129 One can argue that in the above example the campers' failure to take care was
reasonable and they should thus not be subject to liability. But see Kingston v Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co, 211 NW 913, 914-15 (Wis 1927) (imposing liability in a similar situation).
130 See Cooter and Porat, 36 J Legal Stud at 64 (cited in note 88) (discussing situa-
tions where the individual harm is unobservable but the total harm is and offering to
subject each tortfeasor to liability for the total harm).
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step, liability is diluted exactly at the point where the total cost
of precautions outweighs the benefits. In the campers example it
is easy to show that the cost of precaution each can take is lower
than the damage that would occur if such precaution is not tak-
en (40 < 90). The analysis would lead to the conclusion that all
campers are liable, which is the efficient result in the case of one
or two tortfeasors. Dilution of liability ensures that if more than
two campers caused the harm, because all are liable, the indi-
vidual expected responsibility would be for only a fraction of the
damage and therefore none would take precaution. Here, the di-
lution mechanism ensures that those who face liability will take
care when it is efficient to do so and avoid taking care when it is
inefficient.
To be clear, the economist, sorting issues aside, would be
willing to exempt the three campers from liability. Efficiency on-
ly requires that they do not take care, and this can be achieved
by either allowing the campers to go scot-free (under a no liabil-
ity rule) or by finding them all liable and in doing so diluting the
expected cost each faces. The latter method is preferable when
administrative costs are higher (for example, when the court
cannot engage in the cost-benefit analysis or when doing so
would not be cost justified). It is also the preferred option to pro-
ponents of distributive justice as it provides compensation to the
innocent victim.
Dilution of liability can therefore be detrimental or benefi-
cial. It may occur in cases of alternative care as well as in cases
where each tortfeasor's conduct is an independent and sufficient
cause of the injury, as in the arsonists and campers examples
where each tortfeasor wrongfully and independently caused a
fire that could alone bring the damage.131 For similar reasons, it
may also occur in cases (1) where the conduct was necessary even
if insufficient (that is, it was the straw that broke the camel's
back). For example, when water escaped from the defendant's
land and combined with water from other sources to break the
nearly full dam;132 and (2) even when the conduct was neither
131 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 27,
comment a; Professors Brief at *13-16 n 4 (cited in note 39) (contrasting the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 433A illustration 5 with illustrations 14-15 and calling them
"inconsistent[ ]").
132 Based on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm § 36, comment b, illustration 2 ("Mhe actor who negligently provides the straw
that breaks the camel's back is subject to liability for the broken back."). See also id at§ 27, comment f, illustrations 3-4; Professors Brief at *13 (cited in note 39); Town of
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necessary nor sufficient.as For example, in a situation where the
owners of four parcels of land negligently allowed a chemical
that is naturally deposited on their lands to leak into a nearby
river. Even if the contamination of the river would occur only if
three of the four allowed the chemical to leak, all would be con-
sidered jointly and severally liable for the entire damage.34
In all of these situations the same dynamic occurs: since the
damage is constant (that is, the value of the victim's cabin, dam,
or river), liability will be diluted as the number of tortfeasors in-
creases.135 If enough tortfeasors join the activity, no one will take
precaution.
Sharon v Anahma Realty Corp, 123 A 192, 192 (Vt 1924) ("Whenever the separate and
independent acts or negligence of several persons, by concurrence, produce a single and
indivisible injury which would not have occurred without such concurrence, each is re-
sponsible for the entire result, and they may be sued jointly or severally."); Win. Tacka-
berry Co v Sioux City Service Co, 132 NW 945, 952 (Iowa 1911), citing "Pollock on Torts
(2d Ed.) p. 406" for the proposition that "a cause of action for nuisance may be created by
independent acts of different persons, though the acts of one only of those persons would
not amount to a nuisance" and relying on the following example:
Suppose one person leaves a wheelbarrow standing on a way; that may cause
no appreciable inconvenience; but, if 100 do so, that may cause a serious incon-
venience, which a person entitled to the use of the way has a right to prevent;
and it is no defense to any one person among the 100 to say that what he does
causes of itself no damage to the complainant.
Wright, 23 Memphis St U L Rev at 55 (cited in note 39) (noting that in situations where
each of the defendants' negligence was necessary or independently sufficient, courts con-
sistently found liability). Different jurisdictions take different approaches on the issue of
apportionment. Some courts apply joint and several liability. Id. Others, such as the Win.
Tackaberry court, subject the tortfeasors to several liability. Wm. Tackaberry, 132 NW at
948-50. In early cases, the reason was often due to the confusion between substantial
and procedural joinder. See Dillbary, 62 Hastings L J at 1737-43 (cited in note 1). In
other jurisdictions, apportionment is the result of balancing between different policy con-
siderations. See notes 88-87 and accompanying text.
133 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
§ 27, comments a, f, illustration 4; Wright, 54 Vand L Rev at 1100-01, 1106-08 (cited in
note 39); Professors Brief at *14 (cited in note 39); Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 171 at 415
n 6 (cited in note 39) (noting that "[w]hen no one polluter independently releases enough
hazardous material into the environment to cause harm, but the entire group of pollut-
ers, each acting independently, collectively release an amount sufficient to cause harm,
courts may treat each as causal" based on theories such as "the single indivisible injury
rule" or by analogy to the two fire scenario).
134 See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability among Multiple Responsible Causes:
A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure,
21 UC Davis L Rev 1141, 1187 & nn 157-58 (1988) (noting that in such situations some
courts apply joint and several liability on the parties while others apply several liability
and artificially divide the indivisible harm between the tortfeasors); Wright, 23 Memphis
St U L Rev at 55, 57 (cited in note 39).
135 As shown in Part II.C.3, it is not necessary that the damage is constant.
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CONCLUSION
Dilution of liability has been long recognized as a problem
that must be remedied. The core concern is that as the number
of tortfeasors increases, the liability that each faces decreases,
and so does their incentive to take care. The result is that acci-
dents that would have been avoided if only one or a few were
subject to liability would occur if liability were imposed on
many. The focus of the salience literature, however, was limited
in nature. This literature centered on (1) alternative care situa-
tions (that is, situations where any of the tortfeasors can avoid
the accident); (2) where the damage to the victim does not vary
with the number of tortfeasors (and therefore liability is dilut-
ed); and (3) the tortfeasors do not gain from the accident.
While acknowledging that dilution of liability may have det-
rimental effects, this Article shows that the focus of the litera-
ture has been both too narrow and too broad. It has been too
narrow because dilution of liability can occur in many settings,
not just in alternative care cases where the damage is constant.
At the same time, the focus of the literature has been too broad
because its categorical condemnation of dilution of liability is
unwarranted.
In fact, even in the quintessential harmful case-alternative
care cases with constant damage-dilution of liability can be
welfare enhancing. The Article shows that dilution of liability
can incentivize parties to take the optimal care and operate at
efficient activity levels. Dilution of liability does so without sub-
jecting the courts to a daunting aggregate as well as individual
cost-benefit analysis, and it shifts the risk of error from the
courts and victims to the actors. Certain dilution mechanisms
(for example, the EHR) and anti-dilution mechanisms (for ex-
ample, the EDR) can even succeed where a marginal cost-benefit
analysis fails. While the latter can exempt an injurer from liabil-
ity even when the combined effect of the successive tortfest is
welfare decreasing, or can block beneficial tortfests from taking
place altogether, alternative mechanisms can help ensure that
the accident occurs if it is socially desirable.
Moreover, the Article shows that dilution of liability may
even incentivize parties to engage in beneficial tortfests. Using a
number of numerical examples, it demonstrates how certain ac-
tivities that would not and should not take place if conducted by
one or a few parties would and should take place as tortfea-
sors amass and join a tortfest. Here, dilution of liability plays
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a critical role in overcoming cooperation costs between the tort-
fest's participants.
After investigating the impact of tortfests on actors' precau-
tion and activity levels, the Article concludes that, under certain
situations, incentivizing actors to join a group wrongdoing or
combine with others to initiate one can be desirable. It concludes
that members of a welfare-enhancing tortfest should be immune
to punitive damages, even when they acted willfully and with
the knowledge that an injury is likely. The Article also has sur-
prising implications to the apportionment debate. It shows, for
example, that treating successive torts as concurrent where the
damage is clearly and easily divisible can be beneficial. Even a
rule that imposes liability on non-harming actors can be bene-
ficial. The result, it is argued, would be to increase societal
welfare.
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